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Developing Countries and GATT/WTO 
Rules: Dynamic Transformations in Trade 
Policy Behavior and Performance 
Chiedu Osakwe* 
I. INTRODUCTION:  
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE RULES-BASED 
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 
What factors explain the shift to policy reforms and 
liberalization in developing countries1 after the 1940s “special 
and differential” approach to GATT rules and disciplines? How 
did this reform-driven behavior affect the trade performance of 
developing countries, as well as the agenda and functioning of 
the WTO? In describing the legal relationship of developing 
countries to GATT rules and disciplines, Robert Hudec 
observed that GATT developing country members never agreed 
to accept the same disciplines as developed members, but 
 
* Chiedu Osakwe is Director, WTO Accessions Division. 
(chiedu.osakwe@wto.org). The author acknowledges with appreciation the 
contributions and comments of several colleagues: Robert Teh, Dayong Yu, 
Petra Beslac, Joan Apecu, Jan-Yves Remy, Santiago Wills, Nadiya Nychay 
and Terry Townsend. The arguments expressed in this paper, for which the 
author alone is responsible, are not intended, directly or indirectly, to 
represent either the views and positions of the WTO Secretariat or its 
Members. This paper is based on the presentation made at the American 
Society of International Law Conference (ASIL), International Economic Law 
Interest Group (IEcLIG): “International Economic Law in a Time of Change,” 
University of Minnesota Law School, Minneapolis, 18–20 November 2010, on 
the occasion of the re-issue of Robert Hudec’s book, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM, (Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
 1. For the purpose of this study and in keeping with the WTO standard, 
“developing countries” are defined as all countries and separate customs 
territories minus “developed countries,” which include Australia, Canada, 
EU27, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United 
States. This standard is in keeping with the fact that developing country 
status in the WTO is by self-designation and that least-developed countries 
(LDCs) are recognized as a legal sub-category of developing countries. See 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Who are the developing countries in the WTO?, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 
2011). 
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sought exceptions from the GATT obligations and code of 
behavior. The GATT’s legal relationship with developing 
countries consisted primarily of a history of demands for special 
status, which badly served developing countries and 
compromised the most-favored-nation (MFN) obligation. This 
argument correctly characterized the period analyzed by 
Hudec. While strains of this special and differential approach 
have persisted, significant changes have occurred. Developing 
countries trade policy behavior has evolved to demonstrate an 
offensive reformist behavior, but also defensive postures, 
averse to rigid constraints on policy flexibility. How did 
developing countries create their own momentum for 
liberalization and reform?2 Their liberalization impulse is 
explained by the combination of domestic pressures to respond 
to crises and national development priorities, compliance with 
systemic trading rules, adjustments to commitments from 
successive rounds of trade liberalization, and implementation 
of domestic reforms pursuant to WTO accession negotiations. 
The analysis of developing country recently-acceded Members 
(RAMs) indicates extensive trade reforms and optimization of 
WTO-rule compliance. This trade policy behavior has resulted 
in stronger trade performance and resilience, relative to 
founding Members. In addition, a positive relationship exists 
between domestic reforms complying with WTO rules and trade 
performance. Specifically, analysis indicates that the 
liberalization momentum is driven by complex dynamic 
interactions between domestic priorities and compliance with 
systemic trade rules, linked to degrees of flexibility. These 
relationships are in question in the Doha Round. This article 
concludes the Doha Round is indispensable for modernizing the 
rules, sustaining trade reforms, integrating developing 
countries into the rules-based system, and reinforcing the WTO 
as a global public good for international cooperation.  
A. DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ RELATIONSHIP: 
COMPLEX AND EVOLVING  
Professor Hudec still challenges our thinking in positive 
ways. Many of the questions he asked and issues he addressed 
remain highly pertinent today. His 1987 foresight on the 
increased importance of developing countries was 
 
 2. J. Michael Finger, Introduction to ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 19 (Cambridge University Press 
2011).  
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extraordinarily prescient. Even at the time it was obvious to 
him that the role of developing countries in the trading system 
was bound to attract increased attention. The role of developing 
countries in the trading system and their relationship with 
GATT rules is still at the heart of the central and unresolved 
questions in the on-going Doha Round. Despite the evidently 
changing balance in global trade and economic relations 
between the traditional post-World War II trading powers and 
the emerging economies on the other, the Hudec thesis remains 
relevant to integrating developing countries into the rules-
based Multilateral Trading System and managing the complex 
relationship between developed and developing countries.  
GATT/WTO developing Members (countries and separate 
customs territories) have had a complex and development-
mediated relationship with the rules of the trading system over 
a period of more than sixty years. As correctly described by 
Hudec, the relationship of developing countries with GATT 
rules started from essentially a “parity of obligation.”3 This 
relationship, however, metamorphosed, deviating to an 
exemption ramp, with requests from developing countries for 
special and differential treatment coupled with their refusal to 
accept the same disciplines or undertake the same concessions 
and commitments as developed members. A range of reasons 
accounted for this behavior. The preliminary question is, what 
is the current reality? Has the relationship changed? If so, how 
should the current relationship of developing countries to the 
GATT/WTO rules be described? Next, it is necessary to identify 
the factors that improve understanding of the reformist and 
trade-liberalizing policy behavior of developing countries from 
the mid-1980s. What is the effect of this behavior on the actual 
trade performance of developing countries and on the 
contemporary agenda and functioning of the WTO? Finally, it is 
relevant to ask whether there is a “liberalization momentum” 
amongst developing countries. These legal and policy questions 
will remain relevant to the relationship between developed and 
developing WTO Members in the trading system for the 
foreseeable future.  
The relationship of developing countries to GATT/WTO 
rules remains in complex and dynamic evolution. The nature of 
this relationship will be affected by the reaction of developed 
Members. However, although developing countries accept 
 
 3. HUDEC, supra note 2 at 24. 
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commitment to the rules-based Multilateral Trading System 
and are firmly set on domestic reforms and trade liberalization, 
strains of the exemption orientation remain, in addition to a 
more nuanced advocacy for differentiated treatment of 
categories of developing countries at different levels of trade, 
finance and development. The latter approach advocates a 
“concept of differentiation and policy flexibility, not to divide 
countries, but for greater inclusiveness.”4 In other words, as 
advocated, while there is acceptance of the necessity of binding 
rules and disciplines, different categories within the developing 
country group seek differentiated treatment, even while 
reaffirming commitment to the preservation of core systemic 
trade rules. On one hand there is a commitment to systemic 
trade rules, domestic reforms, and trade liberalization, and on 
the other hand, advocacy to rule and policy flexibility for 
development reasons.  
What factors explain the drive for reform and trade 
liberalization since the mid-1980s, in contrast to the restrictive 
and protectionist policies in the post–World War II era? In the 
post-World War II period, most economies, including 
developing countries had high levels of effective protection. 
Average tariffs were in the 20–30% bracket. In many 
developing countries, high tariff levels were combined with 
quantitative restrictions and exchange controls. These 
restrictive measures reflected policy objectives that favored 
infant industry protection, import substitution, and capital 
controls.5 These policies essentially shielded domestic industry 
from competition. From the mid-1980s, a liberalization impulse 
was evident in the trade policy behavior of developing 
countries. A core group of developing countries embarked on 
significant domestic reforms and trade liberalization. Why was 
this so? It is argued that this liberalization impulse amongst a 
core group of developing countries, initiated from the mid-
1980s onwards and sustained into the 1990s and 2000s is 
explained by the combined factors of domestic pressures to 
respond to crises and national development priorities, 
 
 4. Shree Servansing, Coordinator, African, Caribbean and Pacific Group 
of States (ACP), Remarks at Workshop on Recent Analyses of the Doha Round, 
Summing Up and Roundtable Discussion: How Can Policy-Makers Use These 
Analyses And What Other Information Do They Need? (Nov. 2, 2010) 
(transcript on file with author).  
 5. Bernard Hoekman, Changing Developing Country Trade Policies and 
WTO Engagement (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 8210, 
2011).  
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compliance with systemic trading rules, adjustments to 
commitments from successive rounds of trade liberalization, 
and implementation of domestic reforms pursuant to WTO 
accession negotiations. The analysis of the trade policy 
behavior of developing country RAMs is demonstrative. 
Developing country RAMs have undertaken extensive trade 
reforms and optimized WTO-rule compliance. This trade policy 
behavior has resulted in their stronger trade performance and 
resilience, relative to founding WTO Members. Specifically, 
analysis indicates that the drive for reform and trade 
liberalization momentum is driven by complex dynamic 
interactions between domestic priorities and compliance with 
systemic trade rules, linked to degrees of flexibility.  
It is obvious that a complex range of external and domestic 
factors interacted to explain the domestic reform and trade-
liberalizing behavior of developing countries, from the GATT 
era (dating from the mid-1980s). This argument differs from 
the more classical position that, “the GATT played, at best, a 
marginal role in the trade policy reform process in developing 
countries” and that, “domestic policy reform is still primarily a 
function of autonomous decisions by developing country 
governments.”6 While there may be the appearance of 
autonomy, strategic decision-making is hardly ever 
autonomous; they tend to be constrained by both external and 
internal factors. It is argued that decisions for domestic reforms 
and trade opening in particular have always combined domestic 
and external factors, and take account of rules of the 
Multilateral Trading System. Domestic reforms and trade 
liberalization of developing country RAMs confirm this 
proposition rather than being an exception to it. Of equal 
significance is that the external effect of the influence of 
systemic trading rules has been reinforced by the cumulating 
jurisprudence of the trading system is strong evidence under 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO.  
B. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE RULES OF THE 
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM  
Based on a foundation of non-discrimination, GATT rules 
have continued to evolve, reinforced and qualified by WTO 
jurisprudence. The GATT established a legal framework for 
 
 6. Id. at 2.  
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reciprocal reduction of tariffs. A “code of behavior”7 was agreed, 
which rested on three central principles: i) protection should 
rest on tariffs and elimination of non-tariff barriers; ii) periodic 
negotiations aimed at a gradual reduction of existing tariff 
levels; and iii) MFN treat the trade of all GATT Members 
equally. Within these rules, developed-country governments 
achieved a very substantial reduction of trade barriers in the 
twenty years from 1947. Developing country members of the 
GATT refused these disciplines. They sought exceptions and 
although the history of the GATT’s legal relationship with 
developing countries begins with essentially “parity of 
obligation,” it ended up primarily with demands for special 
status. This relationship became a “one-sided welfare 
relationship” in which developing countries are excused from 
legal disciplines while developed countries are asked to 
recognize a series of unilateral obligations, based on economic 
need, to promote the exports of developing countries.8  
This relationship, described as “form without substance,” 
relaxed disciplines, rather than sharply focusing the trade 
disciplines to constructive and beneficial uses, and has badly 
served developing countries more than it has assisted them.9 
For instance, it has been convincingly argued that part of the 
explanation for asymmetric outcomes in trade negotiations 
under the GATT resulted from developing countries’ 
negotiating strategies, such as the insistence on special and 
differential treatment and refusal to engage in the reciprocal 
exchange of liberalization commitments.10  
Hudec’s observations about the relationship of developing 
countries to GATT rules and disciplines described the reality of 
the period which he studied. Three examples are illustrative. 
First, in 1965, Part IV of the GATT (Trade and Development 
Section) was added by the Protocol Amending the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The purpose was to increase 
trade opportunities for developing country Members by 
providing them with special and differential treatment. Article 
XXXVI:8, Part IV, of the GATT 1994 incorporated into WTO 
law the principle of non-reciprocity in trade negotiations 
between developed and developing country Members. This 
 
 7. HUDEC, supra note 2 at 23. 
 8. Id. at 24. 
 9. Id. at 99.  
 10. Rajesh Chadra et al., Developing Countries and the Next Round of 
WTO Negotiations, 23 WORLD ECON. 431, 433 (2000).  
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meant that developed country Members would not seek, nor 
would developing country Members be required to make, 
concessions inconsistent with their development, financial, and 
trade needs; developed country Members were not to expect 
reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade 
negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to 
the trade of developing country Members. Provisions in Part IV 
suggested measures by developed Members to promote 
development.11 There were priority measures identified to 
eliminate barriers to trade in products of particular export 
interests to developing country Members12 and also identified 
measures to improve conditions of access to world markets of 
primary products of interest to developing country Members.  
Second, in 1979, the GATT contracting parties adopted the 
Enabling Clause.13 The Enabling Clause further elaborated the 
non-reciprocity principle and special and differential treatment. 
It provided for preferential market access treatment in 
merchandise trade to developing countries, including least-
developed countries (LDCs), without according such treatment 
to other Contracting Parties, as an exception to GATT Article 1. 
In Paragraph 1, the Enabling Clause provided that, 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of the General 
Agreement, contracting parties may accord differential and 
more favourable treatment to developing countries, without 
according such treatment to other contracting parties.”14 This 
provision applied to preferential tariff treatment by developed 
contracting parties to products originating from developed 
countries within the Generalized System of Preferences 
framework; differential and more favorable treatment 
regarding non-tariff measures pursuant to GATT negotiated 
instruments; regional or global arrangements entered into 
amongst less-developed contracting parties for the mutual 
reduction or elimination of tariffs; and special treatment for 
LDCs amongst developing countries in the context of any 
general specific measures in favor of developing countries. 
Paragraph 5 provided that developed countries should not 
expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade 
 
 11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. XXXVII, Oct. 30, 1947, 
61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 12. Id. para. 1. 
 13. Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries, para. 2(c), L/4903 (Dec. 3, 1979), GATT 
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203 (1980).  
 14. Id. para. 1.  
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negotiations to reduce or eliminate tariffs and other barriers in 
the trade of developing countries.  
In 2010, more than thirty years later, in the Doha Round 
negotiations, a proposal was tabled for a waiver from the 
obligations under Paragraph 1 of GATS Article II to enable 
Members to provide preferential treatment to services and 
LDCs’ services suppliers without the same treatment to other 
Members. The proposed draft waiver was formulated as the 
services equivalent of the 1979 Enabling Clause. As proposed in 
the operative section, WTO Members would decide that, “The 
obligations imposed under Paragraph 1 of Article II of the 
GATS are hereby waived to the extent necessary to permit 
Members to provide preferential treatment to the services and 
services suppliers of least-developed countries without 
according the same treatment to like services and service 
suppliers of all other Members provided that any such 
treatment shall be granted immediately and unconditionally to 
like services and service suppliers of all least-developed 
countries.”15  
Third, beyond the mid-1980s, in the period from when 
domestic reforms and trade liberalization were initiated and 
sustained into the 1990s to the present, strains of special and 
differential treatment have persisted. In the 2001 Ministerial 
Declaration launching the Doha Round, the mandate for the 
launch of the negotiations prescribed conditions for reflecting 
special and differential treatment for developing and least 
developed countries in the negotiations for agriculture,16 non-
agricultural market access (NAMA),17 and to ensure that 
special and differential treatment was made integral to WTO 
Agreements18 and reflected across the entire Doha Round 
 
 15. JOB/SERV/18: Preferential Treatment to Services and Services 
Suppliers of Least-Developed Countries (proposed draft waiver decision 
submitted by the delegation of Zambia) (on file with author).  
 16. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 
2001, para. 13, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1; 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha 
Declaration].  
 17. Id. para. 16.  
 18. Id. para. 44 (“We reaffirm that provisions for special and differential 
treatment are an integral part of WTO Agreements. . . . We therefore agree 
that all special and differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a 
view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and 
operational. In this connection, we endorse the work programme on special ad 
differential treatment set out in the Decision on Implementation-Related 
Issues and Concerns.”).  
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negotiations and Doha Work Programme.19 In the ongoing 
modalities draft texts for agriculture and NAMA, there are 
extensive provisions for special and differential treatment.  
The current trade policy of special and differential 
treatment still approximates Hudec’s description of these 
provisions as “form without substance.” Special and differential 
treatment provisions have not advanced beyond so called soft 
law, good faith, and best endeavor. It is not foreseen that a 
right or an international law obligation would emerge from 
special and differential treatment provisions, such as 
unreciprocated and preferential treatment.  
The more recent mutations of the strain of the special and 
differential treatment approach show critical differences from 
its more orthodox 1960s strain. In its present form, there is no 
longer either refusal of or ambivalence toward the core rules 
and disciplines of the system by developing countries, although 
there are qualifiers for policy and rule flexibility. The 
institutional setting of the rules-based Multilateral Trading 
System and the core rules are accepted. Developing countries 
accept to be bound by the rules and invoke the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU)20 to enforce their rights in 
the balance of rights and obligations. Furthermore, a critical 
difference to the 1960s is that developing countries are 
convinced and committed to domestic reforms and trade 
liberalizing behavior. Systemic trade rules are used to lock in 
these reforms and to justify trade-opening behavior. The 
current approach to special and differential treatment has an 
underlay of pragmatism and realism which acknowledges the 
foundation of non-discrimination, and that special and 
differential treatment will not be upgraded to the status of a 
right or obligation in international law. Systemic trade rules 
are used to argue and justify domestic reforms and liberalizing 
trade policy behavior as necessary means for developing 
 
 19. Id. para. 50 (“The negotiations and the other aspects of the Work 
Programme shall take fully into account the principle of special and 
differential treatment for developing and least-developed countries embodied 
in: Part IV of the GATT 1994; the Decision of 28 November 1979 on 
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries; the Uruguay Round Decision on 
Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries; and all other relevant 
WTO provisions.”).  
 20. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
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countries to achieve growth, poverty reduction, development, 
and multilateral objectives such as the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). In the post-World War II period, 
however, developing countries caused self-harm because 
domestic reform was low on their agenda, domestic industries 
were largely shielded from foreign competition, and trade 
policies were protectionist.  
A frequent question, now more of historical than 
contemporary value, is how did the orientation to the 1960s 
strain of exemption orientation and special and differential 
treatment emerge? From the establishment of the GATT in 
October 1947 (as a Protocol of Provisional Application), both 
developed and developing countries had sought degrees of 
freedom from the disciplines that the GATT sought to impose. 
For instance, the Europeans were sympathetic to the infantry 
industry and reconstruction arguments for protection because 
of their post-World War II needs for reconstruction and 
development. The United States had its own exception 
positions to the disciplines, such as quantitative restrictions on 
agricultural imports and anti-dumping provisions.21 Between 
developed and developing countries, non-reciprocity flourished 
primarily because it was an easy route: developing countries 
could maintain the posture of vigorous representation with 
their home governments; and, it was the easy way out for 
developed country governments. For the latter, it was a cost-
free answer—a concession that developed countries could 
make, without having to go through the unpleasant business of 
asking legislatures for real trade liberalization or real 
resources.22  
Although the core non-discrimination principle remains the 
foundation of the rules-based Multilateral Trading System, the 
rules and core values have been in dynamic adjustment in 
relation to the 1940s baseline. The baseline legal framework of 
the GATT was not to discriminate and to engage in reciprocal 
reduction of tariffs. The code of behavior rested on three central 
principles: i) MFN—non-discrimination and the commitment to 
treat the trade of all GATT Members equally; ii) tariff 
protection and the elimination of non-tariff barriers; and iii) 
periodic negotiations for the gradual reduction of existing tariff 
levels.  
 
 21. HUDEC, supra note 2 at 31–32. 
 22. Id. at 190–91.  
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While non-discrimination has remained an infrangible 
principle and has been strengthened through WTO Article XII 
accession negotiations, there has been an evolution in the 
substance and application of the rules over time. This evolution 
has been development-mediated with adjustments for notions 
of fairness. Currently, the core values and principles of the 
trading system revolve around:  
 non-discrimination (provided for in MFN and national 
treatment);  
 progressive trade liberalization through successive 
rounds of trade negotiations;  
 predictability of the rules through binding of 
commitments and transparency of measures;  
 fair competition and undistorted trade and the 
prevention of cheating, through the rules against the 
use of trade distorting subsidies, dumping, and 
safeguards;  
 development and incentives for promoting domestic 
economic reform through calibrating the balance 
between rules and flexibility, targeted technical 
assistance and capacity building, and Aid for Trade; 
and  
 the DSU that ensures that the rules provided in covered 
WTO Agreements are enforceable if the benefits of a 
Member are nullified or impaired through measures or 
policies by any Member that are inconsistent with the 
rules.  
In contrast to the 1960s, developing countries reaffirm 
commitment to and invoke the rules and the WTO DSU to seek 
enforcement of their rights, pursuant to the rules. They are 
also demonstrating reformist and trade-liberalizing policy 
behavior. Simultaneously, however, there is strong advocacy for 
development-friendly trade rules that institutionally 
differentiates developed from developing countries, with intra-
group differentiation of developing countries, in the 
Multilateral Trading System. This differentiation is proposed 
in two ways: first, for account to be taken of the different 
development, financial, and trade needs in the developing 
countries’ group; and, second, for systemic trade rules to 
provide scope for policy flexibility, such as through waivers, 
longer transition periods for adjustments, and exemption for 
LDCs prior to graduation from LDC status. The complexity of 
the issues involved has been compounded by a moment in 
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history when emerging economies from the developing country 
category are growing faster than the traditional trading 
Members and have become the locomotives for growth and 
recovery from crisis in the global economy. The issues 
associated with differentiated treatment of developing 
countries and the form and substance of the development 
dimension of trade rules, are under discussion amid intensive 
negotiations in the Doha Round. The position of the developed 
WTO Members, such as the United States, is that the 
proposition that the world’s most powerful trading nations 
could play by a set of rules that gave them “unfettered access to 
global markets” without appropriate reciprocity lacked 
realism.23 Such a system was neither a basis for a sustainable 
trading system, nor for an outcome in the Doha Round.  
C. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CHANGING COMPOSITION AND 
VARIED INTERESTS  
The composition and role of developing countries in the 
Multilateral Trading System is complex and evolving. The 
group is heterogeneous. It is neither a monolith nor is it 
unitary. Its interests are mixed, uncertain, and in some cases, 
divergent. The diverse and variable composition of the 
developing country group in the trading system explains, in 
part, why the trade policy behavior of the group as a whole has 
also been complex and difficult to fully or accurately describe. 
There were twenty-three Governments at the signing of the 
GATT Final Act on October 30, 1947. Twelve were developing 
countries.24 Currently, at the WTO there are 153 Members, of 
which approximately 120 are developing countries.25 This 
significantly increased number of developing countries from 
1947 is diversely composed. In the developing country category, 
there are the LDCs, which refer to fifty countries legally 
defined by the United Nations as LDCs, of which thirty-two are 
 
 23. Michael Punke, Deputy United States Trade Representative and 
Ambassador to the WTO, Statement at the Informal Meeting of the Trade 
Negotiations Committee Heads of Delegation (Nov. 30, 2010) (transcript 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/statement
-ambassador-michael-punke-trade-negotiations-committee). 
 24. Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, India, Lebanon, Pakistan, 
Southern Rhodesia, Syria and South Africa were among the founding 
members. See Press Brief, WTO, Fiftieth Anniversary of the Multilateral 
Trading System (Jan. 1, 1998), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/
min96_e/chrono.htm.  
 25. See supra note 1.  
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WTO Members and twelve are in the process of WTO accession. 
The rest fall into the broader category of “developing countries.” 
As earlier noted, the question of who is a developing country 
has always been at issue.26  
In the Doha Round, various developing country negotiating 
coalitions have emerged that provide snapshots of the diversity 
of the trade and economic interests of developing countries in 
the Doha Round. For instance, in the agriculture negotiations, 
several groups are operative. These include the Commodities 
Group; the Cotton-4; the G20 of Members committed to 
ambitious liberalization in agriculture; the G3-33 with 
defensive orientations in agriculture; the G-90; the LDCs; the 
RAMs; small and vulnerable economies (SVEs-Agriculture); 
and the Tropical and Alternative Products Group. Although the 
Cairns Group of agricultural exporters includes developed 
Members such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, its 
other Members are developing countries. For instance, 
Mauritius, a Member of the African Group is designated a 
developing country, but participates in the Doha Round 
Agriculture negotiations with developed Members in the G-10, 
with high levels of domestic support and low ambition levels in 
the agriculture negotiations. This is in contrast to South Africa, 
another developing country member of the African Group, 
participating with other developing countries in the G-20 
group, with low levels of domestic support and high levels of 
ambition in the agriculture negotiations.  
In the Negotiating Group on NAMA, the industrial 
products group, there is a range of comparable developing 
country groups. These include the African Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries, African Group, Mercosur (Common 
Market of the Southern Cone), G-90, LDCs, SVEs-NAMA, 
RAMs, Low-income economies in transition, NAMA-11,27 and 
“Paragraph 6” countries.28  
 
 26. HUDEC, supra note 2 at 160.  
 27. NAMA-11 is a group of developing countries seeking flexibilities to 
limit market opening in industrial goods trade. See, e.g., Statement, NAMA-
11, NAMA-11 Trade Union Statement on the Non-Agricultural Market Access 
(NAMA) negotiations at the WTO (June 26, 2006), http://www.ituc-
csi.org/IMG/pdf/NAMA_tU_statement.pdf. 
 28. The “Paragraph 6” countries area group of developing countries with 
less than 35% of non-agricultural products covered by legally bound tariff 
ceilings. These countries have agreed to substantially increase their binding 
coverage. However, they want to exempt some products. The reference applies 
to paragraph 6 of the first version of the NAMA Draft Modalities Text, later 
paragraph 8. WTO Negotiating Group on Market Access, Fourth Revision of 
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Developing Countries: Trade Performance 
Strains of special and differential treatment persist. 
However, the relationship of developing countries to GATT 
rules from the mid-1980s is evolving. This changing 
relationship, manifested in reformist and trade-liberalizing 
policy behavior and stronger commitment to the rules-based 
trading system, has been reflected in stronger trade growth and 
performance trends. With the exception of those developing 
countries that have been tentative on reform or adversely 
affected by domestic turmoil, the trend of strong trade growth 
performance from the mid-1980s has been sustained to the 
present, taking account of periods of global financial and 
economic crisis.  
In the data reviewed, using 1987 as the base year,29 Figure 
I and Figure II show the trend of trade growth of developing 
countries, developed countries, and the world. Figure I shows 
that, from 1948 to 1987, the trend of trade growth of developing 
countries was in line with that of developed countries for most 
of the period. In the early 1980s, there was a jump for 
developing countries (in 1980 at 32%), although this was not 
sustained. However, as indicated in Figure II, developing 
countries started to outperform developed countries from the 
early nineties (1993). This trend was temporarily arrested 
during the Asian financial crisis in the late nineties (1999). 
Developing countries trade declined in 1998 (-8%) and 1999      
(-5%), while the developed countries still maintained modest 
growth (2% in 1998 and 8% in 1999).30 From 2002, however, the 
trade growth of developing countries continuously outpaced the 
trade growth of developed countries. Global trade was 
adversely affected by the 2008–09 global economic and 
financial crisis. The decline of trade of developing countries was 
a bit smaller (-22%) than that of developed countries (-24%).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access, TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3 
(Dec. 6, 2008). 
 29. See infra Annex 1 for trade value and growth rate.  
 30. Year-on-year percentage change. 
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TRADE PERFORMANCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
       Figure I: Growth of merchandise trade: 1948-1986 
(Index, 1987=100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II: Growth of merchandise trade: 1987-2009 
(Index, 1987=100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Charts in Figure III show the growth in merchandise trade 
share of developing countries from the baseline of 1948. In 
1948, developing country merchandise trade share was 39% 
compared to 61% for developed countries. Developing country 
merchandise trade share declined to 31% by 1987 compared to 
the continued increase to 69% in developed country 
merchandise trade. This period from 1948 to 1987 was the 
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period of restrictive trade and protectionist policies pursued by 
developing countries. The mid-1980s marked the period when 
developing countries embarked on serious and sustained 
domestic reforms, trade-liberalizing policy behavior, and the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiation that was 
launched in 1986. In 1995 (the coming into force of the WTO), 
developing country share of merchandise trade had reversed a 
negative trend to register at 35% and this further increased to 
42% in 2009, compared to developed countries share of 
merchandise trade at 65% in 1995 and 58% in 2009.  
Figure III: Share of merchandise trade; 1949, 1987, 1995 and 
2009 (Billion dollars and percentage) 
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Recent analysis indicates the positive performance of 
developing countries is set to continue. In the second quarter of 
2010, China passed Japan to become the second largest 
economy in the world after the United States. Current analysis 
indicates that developing countries’ improved growth 
performance is not simply a reflection of strong performance by 
China and India.31  
II. DOMESTIC REFORM PRESSURES  
In the 1960s and 1970s, protectionist policies held sway in 
most developing countries. Trade protection reflected 
prevailing trade policy for “industrialization” through import 
substitution and selection of national champions. Trade 
protection for infantry industry was championed as a viable 
policy path to industrialization.  
In the 1980s, developing countries embarked on massive 
economic and policy reforms, including of their trade regimes.32 
This was the era of the “new liberalizations.”33 The reforms 
were imperative. They were responses to the crises in the 
decade of the 1980s.34 Several severe economic shocks played a 
role in generating these reforms. From 1979 to 1981, the global 
economy had been subjected to the second oil shock.35 The 
inability of Mexico to service its debt, signaled the debt shock.36 
The United States increased interest rates, as part of monetary 
policy designed to reduce double-digit inflation.37 This was 
followed by the global recession, marked by negative growth, 
high unemployment rates and low consumer confidence. The 
shocks delivered to the global economy in this period generated 
 
 31. Otaviano Canuto, Recoupling or Switchover? Developing Countries in 
the Global Economy, in THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW: A HANDBOOK ON THE 
FUTURE OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 33 (Otaviano 
Canuto & Marcelo Guigale eds., The World Bank 2010).  
 32. I.M.D. LITTLE ET AL., BOOM, CRISIS, AND ADJUSTMENT: THE 
MACROECONOMIC EXPERIENCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 271–72 (1993). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Although most of the 1980s reform had been initiated as a response to 
the pressures of crises in the period, Colombia was the exception, where 
reforms were implemented without the pressures of crises. Sarath 
Rajapatirana et al., Political Economy of Trade Reforms, 1965–1994: Latin 
American Style 20 WORLD ECON. 307, 330 (1997).  
 35. SARATH RAJAPATIRANA, THE TRADE POLICY OF DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: RECENT REFORMS AND NEW CHALLENGES 5–6 (2000). 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
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crises in many developing countries, with the exception of oil 
exporters.38 These crises, as with several others, combined with 
and played on domestic weaknesses and vulnerabilities. To 
counteract the crises arising from these shocks, developing 
countries in the decade of the 1980s, embarked on economic, 
including trade policy, reforms and liberalization.39 Surveys 
and analysis have suggested links between crises and reform.40 
It has been argued, based on the evidence, that many of the 
countries that opened up in the 1980s, did so as a reaction to 
and in the wake of macroeconomic crises.41 The 1980s crises 
had been preceded by the consumption splurge and the 
investment booms of the late 1970s. In combination, the severe 
economic shocks of the period, the recession and domestic 
vulnerabilities, generated pressures for reform and re-
balancing. The objectives were to improve developing countries’ 
trade and economic performance, increase their access to 
developed country markets, and restore growth. The reforms 
that followed were sustained through the 1990s and have 
continued to the present, with newer versions of reform to 
respond to current economic challenges.  
Several factors were at play in initiating and sustaining 
the 1980s reforms. Research and analysis laid the foundation 
and played a central role. There was the initial research 
preceding these reforms.42 Empirical based studies built on this 
initial research.43 These provided further impetus establishing 
the necessity for sustaining these reforms and trade 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 5–6, 13.  
 40. See generally Mariano Tommasi & Andrés Velasco, Where Are We in 
the Political Economy of Reform? 13–18 (Dep’t of Econ. Univ. of Cal., L.A., 
Working Paper No. 733, 1999) (discussing some of the analysis as to whether 
or not crises actually cause reform). 
 41. MICHAEL BRUNO, DEEP CRISES AND REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE 
LEARNED? 8 (1996).  
 42. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, ANATOMY AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES (1978); Anne O. KRUEGER, LIBERALIZATION 
ATTEMPTS AND CONSEQUENCES (1978) (discussing economic liberalization 
policy).  
 43. See, e.g., JEFFREY D. SACHS & ANDREW WARNER, ECONOMIC REFORM 
AND THE PROCESS OF GLOBAL INTEGRATION (1995); David Dollar, Outward-
oriented Developing Economies Really Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from 
95 LDCs, 1975–1985, 40 ECON. DEV. AND CULTURAL CHANGE 523 (1992); 
Sebastian Edwards, Trade Liberalization Reforms and the World Bank, 87 AM. 
ECON. REV. 43 (1997).  
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liberalization. Broadly, the starting point of the research 
results and conclusions was that domestic policy reform and 
trade liberalization were necessary for growth. The neutral 
incentives, arising from the macroeconomic fundamentals of 
fiscal stability, low inflation and competitive, market-oriented 
exchange rates were necessary, as a basis for managing 
meaningful trade policy and promoting growth.  
Other factors were of equal significance particularly the 
directions of law and regulation for education, human capital 
development and infrastructure development.44 In the ensuing 
period, further contributions were made by leading academics 
and researchers. They emphasized the greater relative 
importance of selective intervention (and not so much neutral 
incentives), technology and solid institutional frameworks for 
the conduct of industrial policy in accounting for growth. 
Academics in this strain argued that economic growth was not 
so much attributable to neutral incentives, as to targeted public 
investments and selective promotion of and intervention in 
specific sectors.45 There were much more than neutral 
incentives and fundamentals at work.  
Although academics accorded varying weights to different 
factors, more important, in this debate, was the convergence on 
the necessity for domestic policy reforms, trade policy reforms, 
and openness. There is a good discussion in the literature of the 
so called revisionist argument rejecting and/or modifying the 
theoretical position that trade liberalization, conditioned on 
neutral incentives fully explain rapid trade (export) growth and 
high GDP growth rates (such as was the case in East Asia).46 
What was not questioned, however, was the necessity for 
domestic and trade policy reforms on the part of developing 
countries. What remains at issue and with continuing echoes in 
 
 44. See, e.g., Chiedu Osakwe, 10th Joseph Mubiru Memorial Lecture, 
Poverty Reduction and Development: The Contribution of Trade, 
Macroeconomic and Regulatory Policies (Dec. 14, 2001) (discussing some of 
these issues in relation to Uganda and concluding that a range of factors are 
essential to achieve trade growth and development).  
 45. See, e.g., ALICE H. AMSDEN, SOUTH KOREA AND LATE 
INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989); Dani Rodrik, The Limits of Trade Policy Reform in 
Developing Countries, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 87 (1992) (discussing some of the 
limits of trade liberalization policy); ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: 
ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN 
INDUSTRIALIZATION (1990).  
 46. See, e.g., Rajapatirana, supra note 35, at 6–11.  
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the WTO today is the correct balance between domestic and 
trade policy reforms, on the one hand, and sectors for selective 
intervention and protection. Discussions are on-going regarding 
the degree of accommodation and balance between trade 
opening, on the one hand, and domestic regulations, safeguards 
and protection, on the other.  
The momentum for trade liberalization was sustained by 
the shift to flexible exchange rates in 1984, and its wide 
acceptance and use by developing countries in the 1990s. Trade 
liberalization has been associated with the shift from fixed to 
flexible exchange rates. There was a greater recognition by 
developing countries that the content of domestic policies 
created the underlying conditions for economic and financial 
stability. Domestic policies had a strong relationship and were 
reflected in exchange rate policies. The recognition and 
acceptance of the relationship between domestic policies and 
exchange rate policies allowed developing countries to become 
more competitive internationally. In this period also, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
enhanced policy support and technical assistance for trade 
liberalization in developing countries. For instance, trade policy 
conditions were elements in IMF standby programs.47 Although 
in contrast World Bank support declined, in the 1990s, because 
of the decline in lending for structural adjustment.  
From the late 1990s onward, there was an inchoate and 
strong dynamic at play, for poverty reduction and development, 
as an objective of domestic reforms and trade opening in 
developing countries. The origins of this dynamic were both 
domestic and externally influenced. From the late 1990s, low-
income developing countries were engaged in the process of the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), emerging from the 
World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework.48 This 
locked low-income countries into an intensive process of 
domestic coordination to design strategies to reduce poverty 
and achieve their cardinal development priorities. The first 
 
 47. See generally ROBERT SHARER ET AL., TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN IMF-
SUPPORTED PROGRAMS (INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1998).  
 48. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers describe the macroeconomic, 
structural, and social policies and programs that a country will pursue over 
the following years to promote growth and reduce poverty. Int’l Monetary 
Fund, Factsheet: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, 1 (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/prsp.pdf. 
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generation of PRSPs encompassed measures and strategies for 
implementing reforms in the areas of investments, private 
sector development, agriculture, health, and education. In the 
subsequent generation of these PRSPs, from 2000 onwards, 
trade priority areas of action were mainstreamed into several of 
these PRSPs (or national development plans), using the vehicle 
of the Integrated Framework (IF) for trade-related technical 
assistance to LDCs.49 The IF process, although external to 
these low income economies, combined with and strengthened 
the domestic reform efforts in this developing country group for 
closer institutional association with the rules-based 
Multilateral Trading System, and more closely secure them to 
the ideas of trade liberalization for addressing their 
development priorities. The IF and its later metamorphosis into 
the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) provided significant 
benefits that reinforced the notion of the gains from trade, the 
benefits of trade openness and the value of trade liberalization. 
A specific point that was highlighted in the trade 
mainstreaming exercise was that trade policy was not stand-
alone. It requires complementary domestic policies that deliver 
effective results. These necessary companion policies include 
infrastructure, education, competition and investment, 
information technology, intellectual property rights protection, 
governance and the rule of law, and effective leadership.  
In 2000, world leaders agreed to eight MDGs to be 
achieved by 2015. One of the MDGs is the reduction of poverty 
by half by 2015.50 It is acknowledged that achieving this goal 
will depend, in part, on the contributions from trade opening 
and the elimination of trade distortions both in developed 
country markets, particularly in agriculture, elimination of 
 
 49. The IF (now referred to as the Enhanced Integrated Framework) is an 
inter-agency framework to assist trade development for LDCs, by six agencies 
namely, the International Trade Centre, UNCTAD, UNDP, World Bank, IMF, 
and the WTO, with representatives of developed and LDCs. (The author 
chaired the Inter-Agency Working Group, IAWG, that was formerly used to 
manage the Integrated Framework from 1999 to 2002). See generally Sub-
Committee on Least-Developed Countries, Report on the Seminar by the 
Integrated Framework Core Agencies, WT/LDC/SWG/IF/15/Rev.1 (Apr. 17 
2001) (detailing the 2001 IF seminar).  
 50. United Nations Millennium Resolution, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000) (describing other goals as well, such as achieving 
universal primary education and promoting gender equality). 
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distortions in developing country markets, and improvements 
in South-South trade.  
Academic research reinforced the drive for trade reform 
and the development dynamic in trade liberalization. This 
research also exercised a strong influence that systemic trading 
rules, particularly for the new Doha Round should be fair and 
that development should be at the core of the Doha Round. The 
case was made before the launch of the Doha Round that 
fairness and comprehensiveness should be two governing 
principles. More specifically, the areas identified for 
liberalization focus, with potential benefits for developing 
countries, were agriculture, manufactures, and services (with 
appropriate regulatory frameworks and funding for small and 
medium enterprises and under-served groups). Research also 
focused on trade and liberalization in factors of production 
(services areas, like labor mobility), non-tariff barriers (anti-
dumping and countervailing duties), and promoting effective 
competition policy and trade facilitation. This research also 
underlined the necessity for domestic-level policies to 
accompany trade liberalization at the multilateral level in 
trade rounds. In summary, research as presented, 
demonstrated that in rounds of trade liberalization, “[m]ore is 
at stake than simply the exploitation of the gains from 
comparative advantages. Trade is vital to the dynamics of 
successful development.”51  
III. EXTERNAL REFORM PRESSURES—THE CHALLENGE 
OF EVENTS  
Trade policy formulation and behavior have always been 
subject to the effects of both municipal and external political 
developments. The 1980s–90s was a period of revolutionary 
change in the international political economy. Latin America 
returned to democracy. New leaders emerged, such as 
President Gaviria in Colombia. The political and economic 
environment shifted in Brazil, Argentina and Peru. On 
December 31, 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed; the culmination 
of a dramatic process that effectively began on January 19, 
1990. Market economics took greater hold with the dramatic 
collapse of the Soviet Socialist experiment with command 
 
 51. Joseph Stiglitz, Two Principles for the Next Round or, How to Bring 
Developing Countries in from the Cold, 23 WORLD ECON. 437, 452 (2000).  
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economies. Lessons were drawn from the collapse of command 
economies, central of which was that this model of economic 
governance was unworkable. The inefficiency and failure of 
state planning were laid bare. There were wholesale 
conversions to the market economy. The transition from 
socialism to capitalism at the end of the twentieth century is 
one of the most significant events in the world economy since 
industrialization. These changes affected about twenty-five 
percent of the global population.  
The economics of transition from centrally planned 
economies to the market economy was closely examined 
because, amongst other reasons, the process was unique. There 
were a range of important studies on the variability of the 
individual transition economies and the lessons drawn in the 
period roughly ranging from 1991 to 2000.52 Transition 
economics emerged as a branch of economics. Important lessons 
were drawn that related, inter alia, to issues of creating and 
strengthening institutions, public and private ownership, 
intellectual property rights, market institutions and the price 
mechanism, financial reform and capital movements, public 
finance, competition policy, trade, growth and development, the 
role of government, and the rule of law and governance. 
Transition indicators were suggested. Central to these were 
liberalization (reduction of trade barriers, prices), 
macroeconomic stabilization (inflation control, fiscal discipline 
and sustainable balance of payments), institutional reforms, 
and legal and policy reforms (to secure property rights, 
privatization, promote competition, the rule of law and 
transparency in government).  
There was appreciation of the enormous difficulties in 
implementing the transition to the market economy. There 
were scholarly disagreements over issues of speed and pace 
with regard to liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization. 
For instance, there were disagreements on the speed of transfer 
of assets from the state to the private sector. However, there 
were self-evident conclusions. The transition from the 
inefficiencies and gross failures of communism and centrally 
 
 52. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, TRANSITION, THE FIRST TEN YEARS: 
ANALYSIS AND LESSONS FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET 
UNION (2002); Int’l Monetary Fund, Transition Economies: An IMF 
Perspective on Progress and Prospects (Nov. 3, 2000), http://www.imf.org/exter
nal/np/exr/ib/2000/110300.htm.  
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planned economies had achieved notable successes and yielded 
important lessons for domestic reforms and significant benefits 
for welfare, growth, and political freedoms. Central planning 
had failed and the market economy had prevailed. These 
fundamental lessons exercised decisive effects on the balance of 
debates in the global political economy. In particular, the 
lessons from the failure of communism and central planning 
were particularly salutary on developing countries. The lessons 
drawn convinced those countries still in doubt about the 
correctness and the power of the market economy over central 
planning and protection. The jury had returned a clear verdict. 
These lessons reinforced the commitment and drive of 
developing countries to domestic reforms and trade 
liberalization.  
Is the transition complete? Are there lessons still being 
drawn? At various times, a group of about thirty-four countries 
have been identified as transition economies.53 Of these, 
twenty-six embarked on rigorous rules-based market-oriented 
WTO accession negotiations: sixteen successfully concluded 
WTO membership negotiations54 and ten are still negotiating 
membership.55 Transition economics remain of active interest, 
and the transition to the market economy for the countries 
involved is a work in progress. The terms of WTO accession for 
these countries and the lessons from WTO Article XII 
negotiations are a key factor driving the liberalization 
momentum in developing countries.  
There has been a succession of financial and economic 
crisis since the 1930s depression. However, the 2008–09 global 
financial and economic crisis has been the most severe since 
the 1930s. This was an event that raised doubts, in some 
quarters, about market economics and certainly made evident 
 
 53. Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, 
Hungary, Laos, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic of Kosovo, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Viet Nam.  
 54. Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Estonia, 
Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan Republic, Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Ukraine, and Viet Nam.  
 55. Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Laos Peoples 
Democratic Republic, Montenegro, Serbia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.  
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weaknesses of the market economy, particularly in relation to 
financial reforms and regulatory issues. For the purpose of this 
study the key question is, how did the 2008–09 crisis affect the 
orientation of developing countries to trade liberalization and 
associated issues in domestic reform? The answers to this 
question have revolved around which countries that coped 
better with the crisis, the WTO-consistency of measures taken 
by individual Members to contain and mitigate the effects of 
the crisis, and the common position by Members of the value of 
the WTO, as a multilateral institution, in the midst of the 
global economic crisis.  
The economic performance of developing countries, their 
reaction, and their role in the aftermath of the 2008 and 2009 
global financial and economic crisis is the subject of continuing 
analysis. The results of analysis, thus far, indicate that 
developed countries were severely affected by the financial 
crisis, while developing countries coped better, and are most 
likely to become the “pulling force” and the “new engine for 
global growth” with scope to “partially rescue advanced 
economies.”56 It is forecast that the superior performance of 
developing countries will be sustained, with the projection that, 
collectively the size of developing countries GDP’s will exceed 
that of developed countries by 2015.57 Some of the factors to 
which this forecast for enhanced and superior economic 
performance are attributed include technological convergence, 
better policies, higher commodity prices, and trade 
integration.58 Details of the analysis indicate that developing 
countries’ improved growth performance is not simply a bias, 
reflecting robust performance by China and India. In fact, 
median growth was substantially higher in developing 
countries (2.13%) than in advanced economies (-3.72%) in 
2009.59 Policies in favor of reform and trade liberalization have 
paid off.  
 
 56. Otaviano Canuto, Toward a Switchover of Locomotives in the Global 
Economy, 33 ECON. PREMISE 1, 4 (2010), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IN
TPREMNET/Resources/EP33.pdf. 
 57. Id.  
 58. See generally Otaviano Canuto & Marcelo Gigugale, THE DAY AFTER 
TOMORROW: A HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 
DEVELOPING WORLD 1, 1–27(Otaviano Canuto & Marcelo Gigugale eds., 2010). 
 59. Otaviano Canuto, Recoupling or Switchover? Developing Countries in 
the Global Economy, in Canuto & Gigugale, supra note 58, at 31, 33–34. 
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The WTO has not ruled or taken a position on the question 
of the consistency of trade-related measures by its Members 
associated with the global economic and financial crisis. And it 
will not do so because questions about the WTO-consistency or 
inconsistency of trade measures by its Members are potentially 
sub judice in an institution with enforceable rules, pursuant to 
the DSU. However, within the framework of the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism (TPRM), in October 2008, WTO Director-
General Pascal Lamy initiated Monitoring Reports for WTO 
Members on the global financial and economic crisis. These 
reports have focused on trade and trade-related developments 
associated with the financial and economic crisis.60 At the April 
2, 2009 Summit in London, G20 leaders requested “Reports on 
G20 Trade and Investment Measures.” Three such reports have 
been submitted so far to the G20.61 These reports to the G20 
have been jointly prepared by the WTO Director-General, 
OECD Secretary-General and Secretary-General of UNCTAD. 
These reports monitor and publicly report on G20 adherence to 
their undertakings to resist protectionism and promote global 
trade and investment. The overall purpose of these two classes 
of reports was to ensure that markets remained open for global 
recovery. Their central lessons were uniform, of which the 
fundamental lesson, inter alia,62 was that, the Multilateral 
 
 60. Trade Policy Review Body, Annual Report by the Director General: 
Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment, 
WT/TPR/OV/13 (Nov. 24, 2010); Trade Policy Review Body, Report to the 
TPRB from the Director-General on Trade-Related Developments, 
WT/TPR/OV/W/3 (June 14, 2010); Trade Policy Review Body, Annual Report 
by the Director General: Overview of Developments in the International 
Trading Environment, WT/TPR/OV/12 (Nov. 18, 2009). Note: The background 
to these monitoring reports was the work of the internal Secretariat Task 
Force established by the Director-General in October 2008, to advise him on 
the trade implications of the financial crisis. Several Members, thereafter, 
requested that the results of the work of the task force be shared with all 
Members and that there should be a discussion among Members on the trade 
impact of the global financial crisis. These reports have since been sustained.  
 61. Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], United Nations Conf. on 
Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD] & World Trade Org. [WTO], REPORT ON G20 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT MEASURES: SEPTEMBER 2009 TO FEBRUARY 2010 
(Mar. 8, 2010); OECD, UNCTAD & WTO, REPORT ON G20 TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT MEASURES: MID-MAY TO MID-OCTOBER 2010 (Nov. 4, 2010); 
OECD, UNCTAD & WTO, REPORT ON G20 TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
MEASURES (Sept. 14, 2009).  
 62. Other key lessons drawn were: i) ensuring continued access and 
affordability of trade finance to ensure that international trade continued to 
play its shock-absorbing role; and ii) knowledge of the fact that the global 
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Trading System, by keeping markets open during periods of 
financial and economic crisis, had demonstrated that it 
provided crisis-affected countries with a chance to recover 
through trade. Trade restrictions contract the volume of trade 
and, by consequence, create welfare losses, decelerate growth, 
and generate pressures for rising unemployment. High levels of 
unemployment create temptations for protectionism. One of the 
many lessons from economic history was that protectionist 
measures have tended to provoke counter measures from 
trading partners with the risk of tit-for-tat protectionism or 
beggar-thy-neighbor policies. The 2008–09 crisis had induced 
the collapse of trade. Global trade volumes fell about 18% in 
the last two quarters of 2008 and early 2009. Although there 
was “low intensity” protection, including through measures 
taken to contain and mitigate the effects of the crisis, 
fortunately, the huge protectionist backlash that was feared did 
not materialize. Prevention of full-blown protectionist 
measures had been kept in check through the monitoring 
mechanism established by WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy 
in 2009.63 The rules of the WTO had provided a buffer against 
protectionist backlash and contributed to recovery and growth 
by ensuring that markets remained open. There was a clear 
recognition from the global financial and economic crisis 
between 2008 and 2009 about the high value of the WTO as a 
global Public Good and the role it had played in the period of 
crisis and recession.  
IV.  MULTILATERAL RULES-BASED REFORM PRESSURES  
Always at risk of either inertia, rollback, or protectionist 
encroachment, the Multilateral Trading System has relied on 
successive rounds of trade negotiations to initiate new trade 
liberalization, inject momentum to sustain trade liberalization, 
and keep protectionism at bay. In making the case for the 
launch of the Doha Round, the bicycle theory for sustaining 
trade liberalization and countering protectionism was recalled 
by Robert Zoellick, the United States Trade Representative: 
 
economy cannot grow above the limits of its real production; growth based on 
excessive liquidity and debt would eventually create painful corrections.  
 63. See generally Pascal Lamy, Director-General, World Trade Org., The 
Values of the Multilateral Trading System, Address Before the Lowy Institute 
(discussing in part the necessity of the WTO’s trade policy review mechanism 
in warding off protectionism). 
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“[a]fter all, there is a bicycle theory for trade: [i]f the trade 
liberalization process does not move forward, it will, like a 
bicycle, be pulled down by the political gravity of special 
interests.”64 Successive trade rounds combined with recourse to 
the DSU, Trade Policy Reviews, and the regular functioning of 
the rules-based system, have generated constant multilateral 
energy for liberalization, in particular in developing countries, 
and for compliance with extant rules. Trade rounds have 
reinforced the policy-relevance and the intellectual case for 
trade liberalization. Developing countries in particular have 
been heavily influenced by systemic multilateral pressures for 
reform, which have combined with domestic priorities for 
reform.  
There have been eight rounds of trade negotiations. The 
Doha Round in progress is the ninth round. The Uruguay 
Round was launched in 1986. It was an important factor in 
sustaining the 1980s reform agenda and sustaining the 
momentum for trade liberalization in the 1990s. The Uruguay 
Round preparatory work contributed to framing the agenda of 
trade opening in the 1990s. It was initiated and negotiated, in 
part, in response to the external shocks, crisis and recession of 
the 1980s.65 The negotiating engagements in the eight-year 
Uruguay Round assisted developing (and other countries) to 
respond to the crisis environment of the decade by designing 
and locking-in domestic reforms, including through 
commitments for the reduction of barriers to trade. Several of 
the results of the Uruguay Round, contributed to sustaining the 
momentum for trade liberalization amongst WTO Members, 
particularly developing countries. These were:  
 the agreement to establish a fair and market-oriented 
agricultural trading system through a reform process 
in agriculture, pursuant to the Agreement on 
 
 64. Robert B. Zoellick, Five US Reasons for Liberalizing Trade, INT’L 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Nov. 7, 2001), http://www.iccwbo.org/iccbiie/index.ht
ml. One of the most eloquently argued cases to support the 2001 launch of the 
Doha Round was by Ambassador Robert Zoellick. Note that Fred Bergsten and 
Jagdish Bhagwati, two champions of free trade, have been associated with and 
variously advocated the so called bicycle theory of trade. Sustained 
liberalization is vital, otherwise the risk of reversals, rollback and 
protectionist recidivism are ever-present. In trade, the status quo is not a 
constant. It is always at risk of slippage. The status quo is not a feature of 
trade policy.  
 65. See supra Part II.  
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Agriculture. For the first time, agriculture, a heavily 
distorted area of international trade, was brought 
within the framework and disciplines of the rules-based 
Multilateral Trading System;  
 elimination of the Multifiber Agreement;  
 the General Agreement on Trade in Services;  
 establishment of the Trade Policy Review; and  
 an enforceable set of rules in accordance with the 
DSU.66  
Empirical data and economic theory show the definite 
association between freer trade and economic growth. This, 
however, does not imply causal linkages. There are gains from 
trade. Countries benefit when they trade in goods and services, 
produced from their human, industrial, natural, and financial 
assets, on the basis of their comparative advantage. The free 
flow of goods and services enhance competition, provide for 
innovation and open up the inflow of capital, technology and 
ideas. In static approaches, the effect of trade opening is the 
increase in real GDP at world prices, through efficiency in 
resource allocation, specialization, based on comparative 
advantage, market-based exit and entry of firms and enjoyment 
of scale economies. There are also dynamic gains.67 The 
evidence indicates that in the first twenty-five years after 
World War II, world trade grew at an average of 8% faster than 
world economic growth, averaging about 5%.68 The successive 
cycles of trade negotiations have contributed significantly to 
global welfare since 1947.  
The Doha Round is the ninth round of trade negotiations 
within the rules-based Multilateral Trading System. It was 
launched in Qatar in 2001. December 2010 marks the tenth 
year at which negotiators have been engaged to seek the 
conclusion of the Doha Round.  
 
 
 66. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
 67. WORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2008: TRADE IN A 
GLOBALIZING WORLD, 27–75 (2008), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report08_e.pd
f. 
 68. World Trade Org., Understanding the WTO: The Basics, The Case for 
Open Trade, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm. 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2011).  
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PERIOD 
 
ROUNDS  
 
SCOPE/MANDATE 
 
MEMBERS  
1947  Geneva  Tariffs  23  
1949  Annecy  Tariffs  13  
1951  Torquay  Tariffs  38  
1956 Geneva  Tariffs  26  
1960-1961  Geneva (Dillon 
Round)  
Tariffs  26  
1964-1967  Geneva 
(Kennedy 
Round)  
Tariffs and Anti-Dumping  
1973-1979  Geneva (Tokyo 
Round)  
Tariffs, NTMs, Rules, 
Services, Intellectual 
Property  
102  
1986-1994 Uruguay 
Round  
Tariffs, NTMs, Rules, 
Services, Intellectual 
Property, Dispute 
Settlement, Textiles, 
Agriculture, WTO 
establishment  
123  
2001 Doha 
Development 
Agenda  
Agriculture, Non-
Agricultural Market 
Access, Services, Trade 
Facilitation, Trade and 
Environment, TRIPs, 
Development, Dispute 
Settlement  
153  
 
There are specific objectives agreed by Members for 
individual trade rounds. Regardless of the specificity of 
individual trade rounds, there is a common purpose. The 
overriding strategic rationale of trade rounds is to provide 
positive momentum for trade reform and liberalization, contain 
protectionism and prevent rollback and, at crisis moments, 
contribute to recovery, with a steady propulsion toward global 
economic growth. Successive trade rounds have contributed to 
sustaining the momentum for trade reform amongst WTO 
Members, including developing country Members. Contracting 
parties, under the GATT, and Members, under the WTO, have 
tailored specific arguments to their domestic constituencies 
prior to the launch and conclusion of trade rounds.  
Policy-relevant lessons have been drawn from successive 
trade rounds for trade liberalization, including from the current 
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Doha Round.69 Three are relevant for initiating and sustaining 
the momentum for trade liberalization: establishing an 
intellectual foundation for reform, demonstrating trade and 
development linkages, and understanding the lock-step 
relationship between the pace of domestic reform priorities and 
multilateral trade opening.70  
First, there is greater sensitivity to perceived “gains” and 
“losses.” Trade policy issues integral to trade negotiations are 
at the center of national policy debates that revolve around 
globalization and its governance, the benefits of global 
integration, domestic issues of unemployment, poverty 
reduction, etc. The intellectual case that was made in the 1980s 
was key in generating the momentum for trade liberalization in 
developing countries. Prior to this, the policy option of trade 
liberalization had been considered overly prescriptive, 
originating from multilateral institutions advocating the 
Washington Consensus. The intellectual case that was made 
contributed to the construction of domestic coalitions for 
initiating trade and wider domestic reforms.  
Second, the first Geneva Trade Round in 1947 focused 
exclusively on tariffs. Twenty-three countries participated, of 
which eleven were developing countries. One hundred and 
twenty-three countries participated in the Uruguay Round 
(1986–1994). Currently, there are 153 WTO Members, 
participating in the Doha Round negotiations. A feature of the 
increase in the membership is characterized by the fact that 
over one hundred were developing country Members. As a 
consequence, there has been an increased demand for a 
development dimension in the rules-based Multilateral Trading 
System and to more clearly establish the trade and 
development linkages to ensure that trade serves a 
development purpose. The development mandate of the WTO 
was set in the Doha Round; hence the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA). An observation from negotiations, past and 
present, is that rounds tend to reflect the situation in the global 
economy, because the circumstance of the global economy 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Chiedu, Osakwe, The Future of the Doha Round after Suspension in 
Geneva and Deadlock in Potsdam: Is it All in Vain?, in AGREEING AND 
IMPLEMENTING THE DOHA ROUND OF THE WTO 16, 36 (Harold Hohman ed., 
2008).  
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typically frames the negotiating environment. In the context of 
the Doha Round negotiations, the pressures remain for the 
DDA negotiations to be sensitive to developments in the 
negotiating environment, such as hunger, linked to the 2007–
08 food price crises, the poverty reduction and other goals in 
the MDGs, the 2008–09 global financial and economic crisis, 
and the constantly recurring use of export restrictions in the 
agricultural sector (particularly affecting cotton, grains and 
animal products).  
Third, there is a linkage between sustained programs for 
domestic policy reforms, on the one hand, with multilateral 
negotiations for trade liberalization, on the other. Furthermore, 
implementation of the results of multilateral trade negotiations 
is linked to domestic reforms, buy-in, and ownership. In the on-
going Doha Round, there is keener understanding about the 
necessary linkages between domestic reform and trade rounds. 
There is a complex relationship between domestic policy 
reforms and multilateral trade negotiations (including the 
implementation of their results). While the pressures of trade 
negotiations and the consequent multilateral obligations can 
exercise a positive effect that provide support for countries to 
lock-in and sustain domestic reforms, the latter can also 
provide impetus for sustaining multilateral trade liberalization. 
(The latter applies to both developed and developing country 
members).71 This general proposition is as true in trade rounds 
as they are in accession negotiations for WTO membership.  
There was a wave of developing country membership into 
the Multilateral Trading System, from the mid-1980s to 1995. 
Between 1986 (launch of the Uruguay Round) and 1995 (the 
establishment of the WTO), twenty-seven developing countries 
became Members of the rules-based system.72 In addition, eight 
more developing countries that were GATT signatories during 
the Uruguay Round became Members of the WTO in 1996.73 
 
 71. Three examples would be the United States Trade Promotion 
Authority and its successive farm bills, the European Union 2009 CAP 
Reform, and the Sectoral Initiative on Cotton from the four African countries 
of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali.  
 72. Bahrain, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Costa Rica, Djibouti, 
Dominica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hong 
Kong (China), Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Macao (China), Mali, Mexico, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Paraguay, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Swaziland, Tunisia, and Venezuela.  
 73. Angola, Fiji, Grenada, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saint Kitts and 
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The larger proportion of developing country Members gave 
impetus to the strong advocacy for a development dimension to 
the rules-based system. This advocacy of a development 
dimension to the trading system was combined with a new 
push by developing countries for the liberalization of the most 
heavily distorted areas of global trade, particularly agriculture. 
Developing countries also strongly pushed for liberalization of 
trade policy instruments that had been in restrictive 
application against their trade and exports. These were 
primarily tariff peaks and escalation, rules of origin and non-
tariff barriers.  
The changing trade policy behavior of developing countries 
towards liberalization was also evident in the dramatic shifts 
from the Second WTO Ministerial Conference in 1998 in 
Geneva, to the Third Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999, 
and the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in 2001 in Qatar. 
In the preparatory work and consultations leading up to the 
Second WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva, the vast 
majority of developing countries staunchly opposed the launch 
of a new trade round. They pushed for the “implementation” of 
agreed results from the prior trade round. The result from the 
Geneva Ministerial was the so called “Implementation 
Outcome.” At the 1998 Second Ministerial Conference, 
Ministers decided that:  
[A] process will be established under the direction of the General 
Council to ensure full and faithful implementation of existing 
agreements, and to prepare for the Third Session of the Ministerial 
Conference. This process shall enable the General Council to submit 
recommendations regarding the WTO’s work programme, including 
further liberalization sufficiently broad-based to respond to the range 
of interests and concerns of all Members, within the WTO 
framework, that will enable us to take decisions at the Third Session 
of the Ministerial Conference.74  
The push to launch a new trade round was deferred to the 
Third WTO Ministerial Conference, the following year in 
Seattle, where there was failure again to launch the next trade 
round, in the face of developing country (largely African) 
ambivalence and strong opposition. The new round was 
eventually launched at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference 
 
Nevis, Solomon Islands, and the United Arab Emirates.  
 74. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 May 1998, 
para. 9, WT/MIN(98)/DEC/1 (1998).  
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in 2001 in Doha, Qatar. Decision-making to launch the round 
had become virtually certain with WTO Members united 
against the tragic episode of the terror attacks of 9/11 and 
convinced that the launch of a new trade round would provide 
greater certainty in the face of global insecurity and calm 
markets. Therefore, from initial ambivalence and opposition in 
1998 and 1999, the vast majority of developing countries 
reversed their opposition to further liberalization, through 
trade rounds, and became strong advocates for the launch of 
the Doha Round. Since the launch of the Doha Round, 
developing countries are the engines driving efforts to conclude 
the round. They have also emerged as strong challengers 
against what they consider as developed country protectionism, 
through the invocation of the DSU.  
The architecture of the WTO as a multilateral institution 
has served to secure rule-compliant, trade reformist behavior 
and systemic pressure to check and counter protectionism. This 
architecture rests on the pillars of enforceable rules under the 
DSU, periodic Trade Policy Reports and monitoring reports 
within the framework of the TPRM, and the accumulating 
effects of the terms of accession of RAMs, pursuant to GATT 
Article XII accession negotiations. This architecture, renovated 
by periodic trade rounds, has acted in combination with 
domestic growth priorities in developing countries to generate 
and sustain the momentum for trade liberalization.  
The DSU is the foundation of the rules-based Multilateral 
Trading System. It ensures that trading rules are enforced, 
that WTO Members operate on the basis of the rule of law and 
that the trading system is secure and predictable. Recourse to 
and frequency of invocation of the DSU suggests deeper 
institutional engagement in the rules-based system. Greater 
recourse to dispute settlement is associated with trade opening 
behavior and commitment to domestic reforms. The data 
suggests that in the fifteen-year period between 1995 and 2010, 
developing countries, taken together, have increased recourse 
to dispute settlement as “complainants.” As a group, they are 
now fairly active users of the system. Increased recourse to 
dispute settlement would suggest greater sensitivity to the 
content of trade measures and the effects they carry for 
consistency or inconsistency with the rules of the trading 
system.  
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Figure IV shows that, after 1995 (the year of WTO 
establishment), developed countries were more likely to invoke 
dispute settlement as complainants in the following four years. 
In more recent years, recourse to dispute settlement as 
complainants, has been more or less comparable between 
developed and developing countries.  
Figure IV: Participation in Dispute Settlement75 as 
Complainants  
 
As indicated in Figure V below, as respondents, developing 
countries have been defendants in about fifty percent less of the 
cases, compared to developed countries in the fifteen-year 
period between 1995 and 2010. A range of plausible reasons 
exist to explain this pattern. Regardless, what is more 
important is the fact that developing countries have been 
respondents in cases regarding the WTO-consistency of 
measures taken. This increases awareness and sharpens 
sensitivity that trade measures that developing countries take 
(as with other Members) should aspire to be WTO-consistent. 
 
 
  
 
 75. Percentages are based on “requests for consultations.”  
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Figure V: Participation in Dispute Settlement76 as Respondents  
 
The TPRM, although not designed to enforce specific 
obligations under the covered agreements or to be used in 
dispute settlement procedures, contributes to improved 
adherence to the rules and disciplines. The TPRM achieves this 
objective through greater transparency of the trade policies and 
practices of Members. Additionally, the TPRM functions to 
examine the impact of the trade policies and practices of a 
Member on the Multilateral Trading System. In doing so, 
account is taken, to the extent relevant, of the wider economic 
and development needs, policies and objectives and the 
external environment of the Member under review. In the 
periodicity of reviews, developed Members are reviewed every 
two years, developing members every four years and least-
developed Members at, more or less, six yearly intervals. There 
have been 112 Trade Policy Reviews at the WTO since 1995,77 
of which, 102 for developing countries or separate customs 
territories had their trade policy reviews, at least once. 
Amongst the fifteen WTO Members78 that have not been 
 
 76. Percentages are based on “requests for consultations.”  
 77. The Trade Policy Reviews of customs territories (SACU, EU and the 
OECS) are counted as one review each.  
 78. Cambodia, Cape Verde, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Guinea Bissau, Kuwait, 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
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reviewed, fourteen are developing countries,79 of which eight 
are RAMs80 (with higher levels of WTO rule compliance in light 
of their terms of accession). Most Members have been reviewed 
more than once.81 The monitoring reports of the crisis effects on 
the trading system have taken place within the framework of 
the TPRM.  
Three recent examples stand-out of trade liberalization 
policy behavior by developing countries, engendered by the 
unique trade liberalizing WTO architecture. These are: i) the 
Sectoral Initiative on Cotton; ii) the Indian proposal on 
“Strengthening the WTO;”82 and iii) support for the monitoring 
process initiated by the Director-General, in October 2008, to 
report on developments associated with the financial and 
economic crisis and to ensure that such monitoring reports 
contribute to keeping markets open.  
Although trade policy behavior has not always been 
uniform and consistent, the system, as constructed, has 
exercised a strong and positively dynamic effect on the trade 
liberalizing behavior of developing countries as a whole. The 
rules-based Multilateral Trading System has been a key factor 
driving the trade liberalization in developing countries. This 
fact was also highlighted in Hudec’s analysis that developing 
countries could and should use multilateral trade rules to 
initiate and lock-in domestic reforms.  
V. WTO ARTICLE XII ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS 
REFORM PRESSURES  
Although there has been a range of critical observations 
about the WTO accession process and questions on the 
substance of some of the results produced, the facts show that 
WTO accessions have contributed in driving the liberalization 
 
Moldova, Myanmar, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Tonga, Viet Nam, and Zimbabwe  
 79. FYROM is an EU candidate country.  
 80. Cambodia, Cape Verde, FYROM, Moldova, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, 
Tonga, and Viet Nam.  
 81. For a full and illuminating treatment of the coverage of Trade Policy 
Reviews and in particular the participation of African countries see, Laker 
Joan Apecu, African Participation at the World Trade Organizations—Legal 
and Institutional Aspects, 1995–2010, (forthcoming, unpublished PhD Thesis 
in International Studies—International Law, on file with Graduate Institute 
of International and Development Studies, Geneva).  
 82. General Council, Strengthening the WTO; Communication from India, 
WT/GC/W/605 (July 3, 2009).  
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momentum of a group of recently acceded developing countries. 
The WTO accession-engendered reforms also explain, in large 
measure, the positive trade performance of the group of 
Members referred to as RAMs, of which most are developing 
Members (countries and separate customs territories). It is also 
true that the results of WTO accessions have affected the 
functioning of the WTO. For instance, this is the case with 
regard to the trade policy behavior of the RAMS in the Doha 
Round negotiations.  
The legal and policy framework for WTO accession 
negotiations is established in Article XII of the 1995 Marrakesh 
Agreement.83 Fundamentally, accession is on “terms to be 
agreed” with Members.84 This is open-ended, although in 
practice these terms have emerged to accord with WTO rules, 
tighten, update and modernize GATT/WTO rules. In addition, 
with regard to the LDCs, there is an additional framework for 
more lenient treatment. In the Doha Declaration, Ministers 
stated that: “Accession of LDCs remains a priority for the 
Membership. We agree to work to facilitate and accelerate 
negotiations with acceding LDCs.”85 As follow-up, in December 
2002, the WTO General Council adopted the Decision on 
Accession of Least-Developed Countries (Accession 
Guidelines).86 The Accession Guidelines did not modify the 
rules for WTO accessions. However, it established a framework 
for the lenient treatment of LDCs’ accessions on the 
parameters of reasonableness of request and offer in bilateral 
market access negotiations, good offices intervention by the 
Director-General and working party chairpersons to resolve 
difficulties, the option of choice for LDCs to accept 
commitments in plurilateral agreements, and enhanced 
technical assistance for acceding LDCs.87  
 
 83. Accession under the GATT was pursuant to GATT Article XXVI:5(c), 
through “sponsorship by Declaration of the responsible Contracting Party,” 
which largely applied to former colonies. GATT art. XXVI:5(c). Accession was 
also pursuant to GATT Article XXXIII, comparable to the WTO accession legal 
framework provided for in Article XII of the 1995 Marrakesh Agreement. 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
 84. Marrakesh Agreement art. XII. 
 85. Doha Declaration para. 42.  
 86. General Council, Accession of Least-Developed Countries, WT/L/508 
(Dec. 10, 2002).  
 87. See id.  
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The accession process has produced concrete and positive 
results for the WTO and the acceding governments. 
Membership has expanded. Since the establishment of the 
WTO in 1995, twenty-five governments88 have acceded to the 
WTO, within the legal and policy framework of Article XII of 
the Marrakesh Agreement,89 and the LDCs’ Accession 
Guidelines. Twenty-one of these governments are developing 
countries, of which three (Cambodia, Cape Verde90 and Nepal) 
are LDCs. The results of accession negotiations and the 
consequent terms of entry for the twenty-five RAMs have 
strengthened systemic rules, reinforced the institution, and 
provided substantial welfare gains for the RAMs and the global 
economy through market access enhancement. Using the 
accession process as an instrument of domestic reform, 
individual RAMs have accelerated trade growth and advanced 
their broader domestic modernization agenda. The particular 
experience of the RAMs has also had its effect on the agenda of 
the WTO. This is reflected in the trade policy behavior of RAMs 
in the Doha Round negotiations.  
The process per se, pursuant to Article XII of the 
Marrakesh Agreement, is long, demanding, and complex, in 
contrast to the accession process under the GATT, pursuant to 
GATT Articles XXVI:5(c) and XXXIII. Negotiations evolve along 
two tracks, bilateral and multilateral, reflect long-standing 
custom, and have varied in length. However, if count is taken 
from the baseline of the establishment of the working parties, 
accession negotiations have lasted, on average, eight years and 
six months. This average time is shorter, if the length of the 
negotiations is measured from the time when the acceding 
government submits its Memorandum of the Foreign Trade 
Regime (MFTR). In this latter category, accession negotiations 
 
 88. Bulgaria and Ecuador (1996); Mongolia and Panama (1997); 
Kyrgyzstan (1998); Estonia and Latvia (1999); Albania, Croatia, Georgia, 
Jordan and Oman (2000); China, Lithuania and Moldova (2001); Chinese 
Taipei (2002); Armenia, FYROM (2003); Cambodia and Nepal (2004); Saudi 
Arabia (2005); Tonga and Viet Nam (2007); and Cape Verde and Ukraine 
(2008).  
 89. It is to be noted, however, that in 1996, five countries acceded under a 
one-off special procedure by the General Council pursuant to Article XII of the 
Marrakesh Agreement. General Council, Finalization of Negotiations on 
Schedules on Goods and Services, WT/L/30 (Jan. 31, 1995).  
 90. Cape Verde has graduated from the LDC category and is now 
classified as a developing country.  
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have lasted, on average, six years and four months. Questions 
put to acceding governments are far-reaching, detailed and 
substantive. This is purposeful. It enables the acceding 
government to undertake a self-x-ray. Most acceding 
governments have admitted that the question and answer 
process, on the multilateral track of the negotiations, enabled 
them, for the first time, to take stock and re-organize domestic 
arrangements for the effective coordination and management of 
economic and trade policy and, the institutions for formulating 
and decision-making in economic and trade policy. The process 
of questioning is substantive, iterative and frequentative.  
The Article XII accession process is unique in international 
treaty development. On the basis of the MFTR, submitted by 
the acceding government, Members initiate a treaty-
formulating dialogue with the acceding government. This 
dialogue is spurred on by a non-stop cycle of questioning that 
obliges the acceding government to be fully transparent in the 
disclosure of non-confidential trade details. This dialogue, 
reflected in periodic updates of the draft working party reports, 
leads the acceding government to accept commitments to 
eliminate trade restrictions and secure flexibilities, such as 
transition periods based on an action plan, to phase-out WTO-
inconsistent laws, procedures, and practices. The dialogue leads 
to the acceptance of negotiated commitment language that 
forms part of the terms of accession of the acceding 
government. These are codified in a draft working party report. 
The dialogue process, driven by the non-stop cycle of the “Q & 
R” process, reflected in updates of the draft working party 
report, is unique in international treaty-making. In several 
areas, these commitments have exceeded those undertaken by 
the 1995 founding WTO Members. This has had raised 
questions about the WTO-plus substance of the terms of 
membership accepted by the RAMs. The substantive terms of 
membership have entailed far-reaching and sometimes painful 
domestic reform decisions for acceding governments.  
On the bilateral track, individual Members exercise the 
right of Members to request bilateral market access 
negotiations with the acceding government. These bilateral 
negotiations are confidential and evolve on the basis of a 
request by a Member and an offer by the acceding government. 
The rationale for confidentiality and the request/offer approach 
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is that through negotiating pressure on the one hand, and the 
carrot of WTO membership, on the other, the acceding 
government accepts far-reaching tariff concessions and specific 
commitments in services, which provide win-win welfare gains 
for the acceding government and the membership. Concluded 
individual bilateral negotiations are then deposited with the 
WTO Director-General who consolidates (anonymizes) the 
results of the individual bilateral negotiations. The results 
apply on an MFN basis to all WTO Members. The accession 
protocol, the draft working party report and, the draft 
consolidated goods and services schedule form part of the final 
package for the acceding government.  
The accession process and the results have been subjected 
to a range of critical commentary and analysis. The issues are 
worth reviewing. Some consider that there are tensions in the 
accession process, arising from the mercantilist heritage of the 
GATT versus the role of the WTO, as an institutional vessel for 
a global public good, and that these tensions are evident in the 
experience of its accession procedures.91 The purpose of this 
argument has been to raise issues associated with the cost of 
accession and that membership is not free.  
There have been criticisms of the lack of transparency in 
the confidential bilateral market access negotiations, which, it 
is argued, has been a cover for extracting non-trade 
concessions. In this vein, some have examined the issues by 
relating what they term as known facts to what they consider 
to be folklore and perceptions because of confidentiality aspects 
of the negotiations.  
A raft of observations and initial discussions have revolved 
around increasing costs, protracted duration, negotiating 
complexity, uncertain and deferred rewards, WTO-plus 
commitments, developmental impact of accession negotiations, 
and the risk of a multi-tiered trading system. In some specific 
observations, for instance, although it is acknowledged that the 
WTO accession process could play a useful role in the political 
economy of trade reform, there is systemic concern that the 
growing price of WTO accession will create a multi-tiered 
trading system. Concerns are raised that the process is 
 
 91. Olivier Cattaneo & Carlos Primo Braga, Everything You Always 
Wanted to Know About WTO Accession (But Were Afraid to Ask), (World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 5116, 2009). 
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unusually long and complex, with uncertainty of the price of 
WTO accession. The suggestion is made that developmental 
needs and sustaining support should drive the design and 
implementation of the accession process and associated 
technical assistance.92 
Related to the concern about the emergence of a multi-
tiered trading system, some have suggested that WTO-plus 
commitments by RAMs carry a risk for the principle of non-
discrimination. The argument is that a two-tier membership (a 
second class of WTO membership) is emerging because of 
different terms agreed with RAMs. In this argument, although 
there are positive effects of WTO-plus obligations, these may 
carry grave implications for the WTO legal system because, 
singling out a Member for differential treatment is inconsistent 
with the fundamental WTO principle of non-discrimination.93 
In sum, the basic criticisms have revolved around the 
issues of mercantilist pressures, complexity, length, 
transparency, accession benefits, development impact, risks for 
the principle of non-discrimination arising from WTO-plus (or 
minus commitments), and risks for the emergence of a multi-
tiered trading system. There are degrees of plausibility to 
several in the arguments.  
Traces of mercantilism persist in the Multilateral Trading 
System. There are no easy or simple ways of eliminating this 
pernicious practice, except to continue to address it almost 
educationally through successive rounds of trade negotiations. 
Trade policy is subject to politics, and mercantilism is one of 
the several points of intersection of trade policy, economics, and 
politics. In spite of best efforts to eliminate this practice, traces 
of mercantilism are likely to permanently linger. However, 
rather than being the problem, it is argued that the accession 
process is actually one of the vehicles for addressing the 
mercantilist problem. The accession process, in a rules-based 
multilateral trading system, is an instrument for resisting 
mercantilist pressures.  
 
 92. Simon J. Evenett & Carlos A. Primo Braga, WTO Accession: Moving 
the Goalposts?, in TRADE, DOHA, AND DEVELOPMENT: A WINDOW INTO THE 
ISSUES 235–36 (Richard Newfarmer ed., 2006).  
 93. Julia Ya Qin, “WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the 
World Trade Organization Legal System: An Appraisal of the China Accession 
Protocol, 37(3) J. WORLD TRADE 483, 512–13 (2003). 
 
OSAKWE - Final Version 4/22/2011 6:21 PM 
2011]DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE GATT/WTO RULES 407 
 
Complexity is in the very nature of the accession process. 
As WTO rules increase and with interpretation, emerging from 
jurisprudence pursuant to the DSU, the complexity will be 
magnified. Complexity is also inherent in a rules-based 
multilateral system, where the rules are enforceable and 
require concomitant municipal WTO-consistent legislation. The 
complexity is deepened because accession commitments are 
inter-locked with domestic reforms and enactment of 
legislation. This is in the nature of the WTO, but is a strength, 
not a weakness.  
Transparency questions have revolved around the 
confidentiality practice in the bilateral market access 
negotiations compared to the multilateral negotiations which 
are open to all working party Members. These concerns have 
been exacerbated in cases where there have been apparent 
blockages and perceptions of blockage, in instances where other 
Members have themselves queried requests that are highly 
questionable in form and substance, and which could only have 
been made under cover of confidentiality. While there has been 
some abuse, the background to the practice of confidentiality is 
useful. It was established as a rational method to assist 
acceding governments to eliminate harmful and egregious 
barriers to trade, in bilateral negotiations, without public 
embarrassing climb-downs for the acceding government. To a 
large extent, this remains the case. However, questions have 
arisen in respect of apparent blockages, in a limited number of 
instances, where confidential negotiations have been used to 
leverage concessions extraneous to the accession in question. 
Fortunately, WTO Members (particularly those active in the 
accession process) are aware of the concerns, and the prevailing 
perceptions and misperceptions. They have responded to the 
demands for greater transparency. In some accession processes 
underway, Members have requested that their questions to an 
acceding government, stemming from confidentially negotiated 
bilateral agreements, be circulated to other Members for the 
process of the multilateral review of consolidated draft 
schedules.  
Other measures have been taken to enhance transparency. 
The WTO Secretariat is reporting more elaborately and 
consistently on the state of play in bilateral market access 
negotiations, although the negotiating core remains 
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confidential to the parties. In 2009, the Director-General’s 
annual report on accession was introduced. The Informal Group 
on Accessions, a Members’ forum for managing the accession 
process and the working parties, was expanded to accommodate 
broader representation and inclusiveness of the Membership 
spectrum. A Secretariat newsletter service was initiated with 
acceding governments. This service not only provides relevant 
information for the acceding government, but also invites them 
to offer suggestions, such as when they would like to convene 
their working parties, based on their self-assessment of their 
state of preparedness, pace of domestic reforms, enactment of 
legislation and progress in their accessions.  
It has been argued that the principle of non-discrimination 
is at risk, with the emergence of a multi-tiered trading system 
(a second class WTO membership) with WTO-plus 
commitments. As argued, this risk is increased, in instances, 
where a Member is singled out in country-specific rule-making 
for differential treatment inconsistent with the non-
discrimination principle.94 This argument and its implications 
need to be carefully considered. At first blush, it is tempting to 
view this argument as the flip-side of the same coin of Hudec’s 
argument that exemptions from the rules, in the form of the 
1940s “special and differential approach” (GATT-minus 
commitments), compromised the MFN (non-discrimination) 
principle. In the more recent, almost mirror argument, WTO-
plus commitments, in particular those targeted at country-
specific rule-making, put at risk the non-discrimination 
principle.95 The question is whether WTO-plus or WTO-minus 
commitments compromise or put at risk the principle of non-
discrimination. The arguments will not be resolved here, but 
perhaps some points could be identified as to how this question, 
in particular the WTO-plus commitments, could be examined.  
First, WTO-plus (higher level) commitments exercise 
different effects from WTO-minus (lower level) commitments. 
The former, on balance, have been decidedly positive to 
complement, tighten loopholes, and modernize existing GATT 
rules, in areas that lacked clarity. One of several such areas is 
that of quantitative restrictions. While there have been 
dissatisfaction and criticism by some, WTO-plus commitments 
 
 94. See id. 
 95. Id. 
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have strengthened the rules-based system. Exemptions from 
the rules, at lower levels, are in a different category. Second, 
the principle of non-discrimination is the foundation of the 
rules-based Multilateral Trading System. GATT rules, 
however, provide for departures from non-discrimination, in 
both the areas of goods and services, but only when Members 
agree to do so, either with regard to rules that apply to other 
Members or with regard to the terms of accession of acceding 
governments. Regarding the rules that apply to Members, the 
most obvious departures, pursuant to GATT rules are Article I 
exceptions, the 1979 Enabling Clause, Article III exceptions, 
Article XIII, Article XIV, the conditional exceptions in Article 
XX and XXI and Article XXIV. In the GATS, these cover 
essentially Article II.2 and Article XIV. In addition, the 
Marrakesh Agreement Article IX:3 provides for waivers. While 
the risks to and departures from non-discrimination have been 
ever-constant, the system has been and remains strong enough 
to fend off these risks. Third, under the DSU, WTO 
jurisprudence demonstrates that non-discrimination has been 
consistently upheld with rulings against discrimination.  
WTO-plus terms have to be carefully examined to 
determine their effects on the rules. It does not necessarily 
follow that WTO-plus will ex ante create different classes of 
WTO Membership, or compromise the non-discrimination 
principle, even in instances where the argument is presented, 
or alleged that such rule(s) have been designed for, or against a 
Member. Evidence in the system and in the on-going Doha 
negotiations indicates several instances, where specific rules 
and draft rules have been designed around a Member. The 
question would be whether such rules strengthen the system or 
weaken it. The negotiations amongst Members indicate that 
the reason for terms or provisions drafted around a Member in 
multilateral negotiations, or acceding government in accession 
negotiations, is to take account of realities, circumstances and 
changing circumstances that are fundamental in trade 
integration and for ensuring the balance in trade relations 
amongst members. Systemic rules (“the whole”) have always 
taken account of the “sum of its parts.” This is not new and has 
contributed to the stability of the system.  
Fourth, the facts clearly indicate that there are variations 
to the terms of accessions. These variations reflect a range of 
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factors. They include development status, sensitivity to issues 
regarding market economy status and related issues in the 
political economy, and the necessity to tailor accession entry 
terms on a case-by-case basis. While the non-discrimination 
principle and provisions are constant, accession terms are case-
by-case. These are not contradictory. What matters is that in 
the final analysis, the dispute settlement system remains the 
final arbiter with regard to questions about whether the 
principle of non-discrimination has been violated with specific 
regard to any measures or policies of a Member that impairs or 
nullifies the benefits of another Member. Further, WTO rules 
apply to Members; they do not apply to non-Members. What 
also matters is that in the first fifteen years of the WTO 
accession process, the results indicate that the rules have been 
reinforced, market access has been expanded, and RAMs, 
individually and collectively, have acknowledged that they used 
the accession process for their domestic reform and trade 
opening. Overall, WTO-plus commitments have tended to 
strengthen the rules and engender trade liberalization and 
reform.  
Taking account of the range of critical commentary, the 
relevant questions are: i) in what areas and in what ways has 
the accession process engendered sustained the trade 
liberalization momentum in developing countries; and ii) what 
effects did these reforms have had on the trade performance of 
developing country RAMs? There are several key areas where 
the commitments accepted by RAMs, including developing 
RAMs, had a salutary effect in driving their domestic reforms 
and trade liberalization. Essentially, these areas that drove the 
reforms and yet provided accommodation for development 
status needs broadly cover:  
 tariff bindings and services commitments;  
 trading rights;  
 export regulations: application of internal taxes/duties 
to exports;  
 export regulations: application of export restrictions;  
 customs valuation;  
 state-trading enterprises;  
 state ownership and privatization;  
 notifications/transparency;  
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 dual pricing: non-discrimination, including national 
treatment;  
 transit;  
 agricultural policies;  
 trade-related intellectual property rights;  
 the anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard 
regimes (price comparability and market economy 
status);  
 the regimes for standards: Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade; and  
 development status.  
Selected areas of commitments on rules by RAMs, 
particularly developing country RAMs, in accession 
negotiations, are discussed with illustrations. The sum of the 
evidence from commitments to the rules plus, engendered 
domestic reforms and trading opening in these countries and 
supported a virtuous cycle of sustained reforms with welfare 
gains.  
In consolidated goods schedules of tariff concessions and 
commitments, RAMs have a 100% binding on tariff lines for 
both agriculture and NAMA. In services, on the average, RAMs 
have undertaken specific commitments in more than one 
hundred services sub-sectors. These are in contrast to the 
average level of commitments for founding WTO Members, 
which, in many instances, have been significantly less. The 
table below is illustrative of the number of services sub-sectors, 
where ten RAMS have taken commitments in relation to ten 
original WTO Members with significant interest in services 
trade (this is not a comparison).  
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SERVICES: NUMBER OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS IN SERVICES 
SUB-SECTORS 
 
RAMs  Number of 
Spec/Commitments  
 
Original 
Members 
Number of 
Spec/Commitments 
China 93 EU  115  
Viet Nam  105 US  110  
Saudi 
Arabia  
120  Hong Kong, 
China  
68  
Oman  98  Singapore  67  
Moldova  147  Brazil  43 
Kyrgyz  138  Egypt  44 
Jordan  110  India 37  
Cambodia 
(LDC)  
94  Nigeria  32  
Nepal (LDC)  77  South Africa  91 
Cape Verde 
(LDC)  
93  Tanzania 
(LDC)  
1  
 
Through the number and quality of their services 
commitments, RAMs have signaled areas of domestic reforms, 
existence of prudential regulations, and openness for domestic 
and foreign investments. Telecommunications and financial 
services are two good examples. 
Trading rights is an area where the non-discrimination 
principle and its MFN and national treatment rules have been 
improved and tightened. Trading rights have uniquely emerged 
from accession negotiations and acquis. Classically, GATT rules 
were formulated with regard to products and less so to traders 
(individuals and enterprises). However, governments in 
regulating trade, adopt regulations and laws, which require 
traders to register their businesses for importing and 
exporting. In practice, conditions for business registration for 
trade in goods, could and do discriminate between goods 
imported from one country, or countries, or from domestically 
produced goods. Limitations to trading rights can take a range 
of forms, such as quantity or price-based limitations, prior 
approvals (which could be discretionary), and registered scope 
of business.  
The purpose of the trading rights commitment is to ensure 
that all traders in a country or separate customs territory, 
including “importers of record,”96 have a right to trade in all 
 
 96. An “importer of record" is the right of a trader to import goods into a 
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goods, and that conditions for the registration of businesses 
neither discriminate nor modify this right to trade, other than 
simple and/or automatic registration. In sum, trading rights 
are the rights of legal and natural persons of any Member, 
exercised by importers of record, to import goods into the 
territory of another, as distinguished from the right to sell or 
distribute, and without this right modified, or subject to 
nationality or residency limitations, or other conditions or 
requirements. Trading rights are in accordance with GATT 
Articles III: 2 and 4, XI.1 and VIII: 1(a). There were no trading 
rights commitments by RAMs in the first four accession 
packages.97 However, in the subsequent accession packages, 
twenty-one RAMs accepted commitments on trading rights.98 
The standard commitment terminology in an accession package 
is represented by that of Cape Verde as follows:  
The representative of Cape Verde confirmed that from the date of 
accession, Cape Verde would grant any natural or legal person, 
regardless of physical presence or investment in Cape Verde, the 
right to be the importer of record of any product allowed to be 
imported into Cape Verde, at any level of distribution, and that its 
laws and regulations relating to the right to trade in goods and all 
fees, charges or taxes levied on such rights would conform fully with 
its WTO obligations, including Articles VIII:1(a), XI:1, and III:2 and 
4 of the GATT 1994, Article III of the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services, and Article 63 of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. He also confirmed that full 
rights to import and to export would be granted in a 
non-discriminatory and non-discretionary manner from the date of 
accession, and any requirements for commercial registration or 
application for trading rights would be for customs and fiscal 
purposes only, would not require investment in Cape Verde nor 
confer the right to distribute there, and would not constitute a barrier 
to trade. The Working Party took note of these commitments.99  
Export restrictions, including export duties and taxes, 
affect trade. There are questions about the clarity and intent of 
 
country or separate customs territory, without this right being modified by 
nationality or residency, and without the right to sell or distribute goods in a 
country or separate customs territory.  
 97. Bulgaria, Ecuador, Mongolia, and Panama. 
 98. Albania, Armenia, Cambodia, Cape Verde, China, Chinese Taipei, 
Croatia, Estonia, FYROM, Georgia, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, Nepal, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tonga, Ukraine, and Viet 
Nam.  
 99. Working Party on the Accession of Cape Verde, Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession of Cape Verde to the World Trade Organization, para. 
79, WT/ACC/CPV/30 (Dec. 6, 2007).  
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GATT Article XI, on quantitative restrictions, on the extent of 
the coverage of export restriction, and why some restrictions 
were covered and others not. Many observers have also felt that 
this area of the rules required updating and modernization, 
adjustment to contemporary realities, and greater clarity. 
Article XI of GATT 1947 (and 1994) covered and prohibited 
restrictions on imports and exports made effective through 
quotas, import or export licenses, with exceptions provided for 
in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c)(i), (ii) and (iii). Article XI did 
not cover export duties, taxes or other charges. Article 12 of the 
1994 Agreement on Agriculture largely provided for 
transparency disciplines for measures, pursuant to Article 
XI.2(a) of GATT 1994 and further limited the application of the 
provision to only developing countries that are net-food 
exporters of the specific foodstuff concerned and excluded other 
developing countries that are not net-food exporters. It is in 
this context of incomplete coverage, lack of full clarity, and 
looseness in an area with potentially significant impacts on 
trade, that tighter disciplines have been developed in accession 
negotiations.  
Commitment language was accepted by six RAMs100 on 
export duties, taxes, and charges. The commitment language 
has ranged from phasing out and elimination of export duties, 
with exceptions to reduction of export duties, and non-
application of any obligatory minimum prices. In the working 
party reports, the affected RAMs established “tables” where 
export duties apply and, in cases of reduction, agreed to a 
schedule for reduction. This area of export duties, taxes, and 
charges will be one of active legal and policy interest over the 
course of the on-going thirty accession negotiations.  
In the area of export restrictions (export and import 
licensing) covered by GATT Article XI, eighteen RAMs have 
accepted commitment language that has tightened adherence 
to the extant rules and closed loopholes. Although there are 
variations adapted to the specificities of individual accessions, 
the standard commitment on export restrictions that has 
emerged is provided for in the Working Party Report of Oman: 
“The representative of Oman confirmed that any export control 
requirements remaining in place on the date of accession would 
be fully consistent with WTO provisions, including those 
 
 100. China, Latvia, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and Viet Nam.  
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contained in Articles XI, XVII, XX and XXI of the GATT 1994. 
The Working Party took note of this commitment.”101 The 
different uses of quantitative restrictions continue to rivet 
policy and academic focus in trade policy. The degree of interest 
has been constant from the position expressed by the United 
States Chief Trade Negotiator in 1949:  
Quantitative restrictions present the major issue of commercial policy 
. . . . If uncontrolled, they promise to become universal and 
permanent. Freedom to employ them is not readily to be surrendered. 
The proposal that this freedom be limited evoked a debate that went 
on for many months. The toughest problem in the trade negotiations 
came to be known by its initials: Q.R. It would not be inaccurate to 
describe the meetings in London, Geneva, and Havana as the United 
Nations Conferences on Q.R.102  
Overall, in this area of export restrictions, export duties, 
charges, and taxes the consideration has been that accession 
acquis in these areas have strengthened the disciplines and 
rules. The trade policy community has noted that WTO 
accessions have created and will continue to create disciplines 
on export restrictions and export duties that complement the 
GATT 1994.103  
Customs valuation is an area strongly associated with 
trade reform and the benefits of openness to trade. RAMs have 
accepted commitments to implement GATT Article VII 
(establishing the transaction value, as the primary basis for the 
determination of customs value, and eliminating minimum 
prices, reference prices and fixed valuation methods).104 
Commitments undertaken include implementation of Article 
VIII.105 Commitment to the implementation of Article X bound 
RAMs to the transparency obligation and the establishment of 
judicial, arbitral, administrative tribunals, or procedures for 
the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and correction of 
 
 101. Working Party on the Accession of Oman, Report of the Working Party 
on the Accession of Oman to the World Trade Organization, para. 77 , 
WT/ACC/OMN/26 (Sept. 28, 2000). 
 102. CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE, 82 (1972) cited in 
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 31 n.29 (2d ed. 
2008). 
 103. Jeonghoi Kim, Recent Trends in Export Restrictions (Org. for Econ. 
Cooperation and Dev., Trade Policy Working Papers, No: 101, 2010). 
 104. See Working Party on the Accession of China, Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession of China, para. 140, WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001). 
 105. Specifically, Article VIII requires that fees and charges for exports and 
important approximate the costs of services rendered. See GATT art. VIII.  
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administrative action relating to customs matters. Although 
there have been variations depending on the particular 
situation of the acceding government, the commitment 
language accepted by Viet Nam is illustrative:  
The representative of Viet Nam confirmed that, from the date of 
accession, Viet Nam would fully apply the WTO provisions 
concerning customs valuation, including the Agreement on the 
Implementation of Article VII of the GATT 1994 and Annex I 
(Interpretative Notes). Viet Nam would ensure that any customs 
valuation method to be applied would be in accordance with these 
WTO rules. In this regard, he confirmed that minimum prices and 
any system of reference prices or fixed valuation schedule applied to 
imports in lieu of the transaction value to determine customs 
valuation had been eliminated and would not be reintroduced and that 
all methods of valuation used were in strict conformity with those 
provided for in the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement. . . . The 
Working Party took note of these commitments.106  
The related areas of state trading entities, state ownership, 
and privatization have been fundamental to sustainable 
reform, more so for economies, especially developing economies 
shifting from command to open markets. Reforms in these 
areas, pursuant to the WTO accession process have assisted 
developing countries’ momentum toward trade reform and 
openness. The commitment languages accepted by China and 
Viet Nam, two developing countries, are illustrative. In the 
case of China:  
The representative of China further confirmed that China would 
ensure that all state-owned and state-invested enterprises would make 
purchases and sales based solely on commercial considerations, 
e.g., price, quality, marketability and availability, and that the 
enterprises of other WTO Members would have an adequate 
opportunity to compete for sales to and purchases from these 
enterprises on non-discriminatory terms and conditions. In addition, 
the Government of China would not influence, directly or indirectly, 
commercial decisions on the part of state-owned or state-invested 
enterprises, including on the quantity, value or country of origin of 
any goods purchased or sold, except in a manner consistent with the 
WTO Agreement. The Working Party took note of these 
commitments.107  
 
 106. Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam, Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession of Viet Nam, para. 238, WT/ACC/VNM/48 (Oct. 27, 
2006).  
 107. Working Party on the Accession of China, supra note 104, para. 49.  
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And in the case of Viet Nam, similar, if not identical 
language was accepted.108  
The biggest challenge for accession-induced reforms, 
entailed the transition from the centrally-planned (including 
former socialist systems) to market-driven economies, 
particularly through commitments to comply with GATT 
Article XVII109 and transparency commitments on privatization 
programs. The commitment language by China, as a developing 
country, with regard to Article XVII provisions on State 
Trading Enterprises is illustrative.110  
Although there are no GATT/WTO rules on privatization, a 
vicious circle has emerged, induced by accession negotiations 
specifically in the context of the accession dialogue on state 
ownership and state trading. Seventeen RAMs111 accepted 
accession terms according to which they agreed to provide 
periodic reports (essentially notifications) to WTO Members to 
ensure the transparency of their privatization programs.112 The 
commitment language by Cambodia, a LDC, is illustrative:  
 
 108. Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam, supra note 106, para. 78. 
The representative of Viet Nam confirmed that Viet Nam would ensure that 
all enterprises that were State-owned or State-controlled, including equitized 
enterprises in which the State had control, and enterprises with special or 
exclusive privileges, would make purchases, not for governmental use, and 
sales in international trade, based solely on commercial considerations, for 
example, price, quality, marketability, and availability, and that the 
enterprises of other WTO Members would have an adequate opportunity in 
accordance with customary business practice to compete for participation in 
sales to and purchases from these enterprises on non-discriminatory terms 
and conditions. In addition, the Government of Viet Nam would not influence, 
directly or indirectly, commercial decisions on the part of enterprises that are 
State-owned, State-controlled, or that have special and exclusive privileges, 
including decisions on the quantity, value or country of origin of any goods 
purchased or sold, except in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement 
and the rights accorded to non-governmental enterprise owners or 
shareholders. The Working Party took note of these commitments. 
 109. GATT Article XVII, which outlines the rule on State Trading 
Enterprises (STEs), directs that STEs shall not discriminate for governmental 
measures affecting imports and exports by private traders and requires STEs 
to act solely in accordance with commercial considerations. See GATT art. 
XVII.  
 110. See supra text accompanying note 107.  
 111. Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chinese Taipei, 
Croatia, Estonia, FYROM, Georgia, Kyrgz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, and Ukraine. 
 112. E.g., Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO Welcomes Ukraine as a 
New Member (Feb. 5, 2008) http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres08_e/pr511
_e.htm. 
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The representative of Cambodia stated that his Government would 
ensure the transparency of its ongoing privatization programme and 
would keep WTO Members informed of progress in the reform of its 
economic and trade regimes. He stated that his Government would 
provide periodic reports to WTO Members on developments in its 
programme of privatization as long as the privatization programme 
would be in existence, along the lines of that already provided to the 
Working Party. He also stated that his Government would provide 
periodic reports on other issues related to its economic reform as 
relevant to its obligations under the WTO. The Working Party took 
note of these commitments.113  
In several ongoing accessions affecting formerly centrally 
planned economies, the privatization trend and disposition to 
provide information on privatization programs has been 
maintained. For example, the Serbian delegation informed 
WTO Members:  
The privatization of commercial companies that began in 2001 
continues in this year as well. . . . One of the major goals of the 
Serbian Government is the finishing of the process of privatisation of 
remaining socially owned enterprises, as well as introducing 
competition into markets of infrastructure and public utilities. From 
the beginning of the process of privatization until September 2010, 
the total number of privatized enterprises amounted to 2414. These 
efforts go hand in hand with necessary legal reforms aimed, inter alia, 
at improving the business climate.114  
Dual pricing has been one of the sources of distortions in 
the global economy. Through the terms of accession some of the 
larger economies with the capacity to affect the global economy 
have addressed this issue. In the China accession terms:  
The representative of China further confirmed that China would 
provide the same treatment to Chinese enterprises, including foreign-
funded enterprises, and foreign enterprises and individuals in China. 
China would eliminate dual pricing practices as well as differences in 
treatment accorded to goods produced for sale in China in 
comparison to those produced for export. The Working Party took 
note of these commitments.115  
Accession negotiations and terms of membership have 
induced sustained domestic reforms that have set a clear 
direction towards the market economy. These reforms have 
 
 113. Working Party on the Accession of Cambodia, Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession of Cambodia, para. 25, WT/ACC/KHM/21 (Aug. 15, 
2003).  
 114. Vesna Arsic, State Sec’y, Statement at the 9th Meeting of the Working 
Party on the Accession of the Republic of Serbia to the World Trade 
Organization 4 (Oct. 20, 2010) (transcript on file with the author). 
 115. Working Party on the Accession of China, supra note 104, para. 18. 
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been clearly reflected in accession terms for the determination 
of price comparability in anti-dumping pursuant to the 
Agreement on the Implementation of GATT Article VI (the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement).116 Market economy status has been 
central in accession terms for addressing subsidies pursuant to 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
Both China and Viet Nam’s terms of action committed 
producers in the acceding governments to show the prevalence 
of market economy conditions with the additional requirement 
that those conditions satisfy the importing Member’s national 
law. For instance, with regard to China accession terms, in its 
Protocol, China undertook the commitment that:  
(a) In determining price comparability under Article VI of the GATT 
1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the importing WTO 
Member shall use either Chinese prices or costs for the industry 
under investigation or a methodology that is not based on a strict 
comparison with domestic prices or costs in China based on the 
following rules: 
(i) If the producers under investigation can clearly show that 
market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like 
product with regard to the manufacture, production and sale of that 
product, the importing WTO Member shall use Chinese prices or 
costs for the industry under investigation in determining price 
comparability; 
(ii) The importing WTO Member may use a methodology that 
is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in 
China if the producers under investigation cannot clearly show that 
market economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like 
product with regard to manufacture, production and sale of that 
product.117  
Across the entire area of accession negotiations, acceding 
governments have accepted commitments, backed up by 
domestic legislation, confirming acceptance of GATT rules. 
Additionally they have complemented, reinforced and, in some 
areas, extended these rules, while regarding the particular 
circumstance of the acceding government. These commitments 
have strengthened the MFN principle, the transparency rule, 
and set a clear direction for sustained market reforms and 
trade opening.  
A horizontal issue emphasized by other commentators is 
that accession terms have not taken account of development 
 
 116. See id. para. 178.  
 117. Id. at 73.  
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needs and circumstance. The facts indicate that although 
accession terms have neither explicitly ascribed development 
status, with the exception of LDCs, nor allowed ex ante 
deviations from the rules on account of development status, 
accession negotiations have taken account of development 
needs in specific ways. This is reflected by the LDCs’ Accession 
Guidelines,118 action plan-based transitional time frames for 
acceding governments to implement their commitments, and 
the set de minimis levels for Aggregate Measurement of 
Support (AMS) directing developing country domestic support 
for agriculture.119 In the case of Jordan, WTO Members in the 
Working Party took particular account of the development 
circumstance of Jordan for purposes of Article 6.4 in the 
Agreement on Agriculture. In setting the AMS reduction 
commitment for Jordan over a seven-year period, Members, 
“also considered that for the purposes of Article 6.4 of the WTO 
Agriculture Agreement, Jordan was a developing country.”120  
In the course of accession negotiations, Members have 
ensured that acceding governments accept commitments to the 
existing rules. These commitments require acceptance of the 
rules-plus (in several instances) and enactment of domestic 
legislation that provides statutory backing for these 
commitments. Part of the accession package is a Legislative 
Action Plan. Trade-relevant legislation is deposited with the 
WTO Secretariat for review by Members. This strong 
legislative foundation was largely absent for the different 
specific areas of WTO rules for many founding WTO Members, 
including developing countries. Transparency and greater 
openness in trade have been associated with faster growth.  
In reviewing the impact of their WTO accession, RAMs 
have repeatedly stressed its positive effects on the rule of law, 
domestic coordination for trade policymaking (frequently 
absent or minimal prior to the accession process), trade-
 
 118. See General Council, Accession of Least-Developed Countries, 
WT/L/508 (Jan. 20, 2003).  
 119. In accordance with the rules in the Agreement on Agriculture, the de 
minimis levels are 5% for developed countries and 10% for developing 
countries, with LDCs not subject to reduction commitments in domestic 
support. See Marrakesh Agreement Annex 1A. 
 120. Working Party on the Accession of Jordan, Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the World Trade 
Organization, para. 189, WT/ACC/JOR/33 (Dec. 3, 1999). 
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opening, and the predictability of trade and investment. In 
spite of the complexities and rigors of the WTO accession 
process, representatives of RAMs have acknowledged the high 
value of the accession process, as a necessary instrument for 
their domestic policy reform, specifically for economy-boosting 
trade liberalization.121 In a recent statement, the RAMs, as a 
group, stated:  
[A]s Members of the RAMs group we have always strongly 
advocated that the accession of new Members to the WTO, including 
developing countries and in particular LDCs, continues to broaden 
the scope of trade covered under WTO disciplines. Universal 
membership in the WTO is a critical factor in the establishment of a 
strong rules-based trading system. We therefore call for the 
expeditious accession process for developing countries and in 
particular LDCs. . . .122   
Individual RAMs have also evaluated the impact of their 
WTO accession on their trade performance and welfare. Saudi 
Arabia recently stated: 
What we have seen as the consequence of Saudi Arabia’s accession 
to the World Trade Organization at the end of 2005 is . . . the 
acceleration of growth rates—almost a doubling of the rate of 
growth. With it has come an in foreign investment in Saudi 
Arabia. . . . The investments that are taking place in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia will generate jobs and they are generating jobs.123  
Taking account of periods of global financial and economic 
crises, recession and domestic turmoil within countries, trade 
data (provided below) suggest that RAMs achieved significant 
gains in trade performance with more stable performance, 
following their accession-related domestic reforms and trade 
liberalization, compared to the pre-accession reform period.  
The trade data indicate that the international trade of all 
RAMs increased significantly as they started to implement 
their accession-related reforms, some of these pre-accession, 
others upon accession, and some through agreed phased 
 
 121. Confirmed by numerous conversations with representatives of RAMs 
from Cambodia, China, Viet Nam, Cape Verde. See also World Trade 
Organization, Ministerial Conference 7th Session, Round Table Statement on 
the Least-Developed Countries’ Accessions, WT/MIN(09)/1 (Oct. 5, 2009). 
 122. WTO General Council, 21 October 2010. Remarks by the 
Representatives of Chinese Taipei, on behalf of the Group of Recently Acceded 
Members (RAMs).  
 123. Ambassador Adel Al-Jubeir, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the 
United States, Remarks at the NCUSAR Annual Conference (Oct. 21, 2010), 
http://www.saudiembassy.net/announcement/announcement10221001.aspx. 
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transition. Figure VI and Annex 2 show that from 1995124 to 
2009, the value of merchandise trade grew at average annual 
rates of 13%, while Figure VII and Annex 3 show that trade in 
commercial services grew by 11%. These average annual 
growth rates were much faster in comparison to the growth of 
world merchandise trade at 7% and services at 8%. Between 
1995 and 2008125 the value of merchandise trade of all RAMs 
rose by approximately 500% in contrast to world trade that 
increased by about 200%.  
Figure VI: Value of merchandise trade of all RAMs and 
developing country or territory RAMs: 1995-2009126 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 124. The establishment of the World Trade Organization was in 1995.  
 125. This period saw growth prior to the effects of the global economic and 
financial crisis of 2008–09. 
 126. Twenty-five RAMs minus Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
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Figure VII: Value of trade in services of all RAMs and 
developing country or territory RAMs: 1995-2009 
 
This positive trade performance was also reflected in the 
share of world merchandise trade of RAMs, which significantly 
increased from 6 to 12% during 1995–2009 as seen in Figure 
VIII.  
Figure VIII: RAMs’ share of world merchandise trade: 1995-
2009127(Billion dollars and percentage) 
  
 
 127. Figures incorporating 2009 data reflect the trade collapse experienced 
as a result of the 2008–2009 global financial and economic crisis, making 
RAMs’ growth all the more significant. 
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For the merchandise exports of the LDCs recently acceded 
Members, between the year of their individual accessions and 
the most recent figures available (2009), there is a varied 
picture as seen in Figure IX(A). A significant percentage 
change was registered for Cambodia at 63%, which acceded in 
2004, with a modest positive change for Cape Verde at 10%, 
which acceded in 2008, the year the global economic crisis 
began, and a negative merchandise export for Nepal at -12%, 
which acceded in 2004.  
Figure IX (A): Value of merchandise exports of RAMs 
that acceded as LDCs: 1995-2009  
 
 
For the non-LDCs recently acceded developing Members, 
between the year of their individual accessions and the most 
recent figures available (2009), significant percentage changes 
were registered. Ecuador, which acceded in 1996, experienced a 
164% change and Panama, which acceded in 1997, experienced 
a 22% change, as seen in Figure IX (B). 
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Figure IX (B): Value of merchandise exports of 
Ecuador and Panama: 1995-2009 
  
 
Between the year of its accession (2005) and 2008, the 
percentage change for the merchandise export of Saudi Arabia 
was 73%, a growth differential that was cut to 4% when 
analyzed from the year of accession to 2009 at the height of the 
economic crisis. Oman, which acceded in 2000, registered a 
percentage change in merchandise exports of 134% between its 
accession year and 2009 as seen in Figure IX (C).  
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Figure IX (C): Value of merchandise exports of Saudi 
Arabia and Oman: 1995-2009 
  
 
Viet Nam registered a percentage change of 29% in 
merchandise export between its year of accession in 2007 and 
2008, a differential that was cut to 16% when analyzed from 
the accession year to 2009. China, which acceded in 2001, 
registered a percentage change in merchandise exports of 437% 
between its accession year and 2008, but experienced a 
decrease in its growth rate down to 352% in 2009 compared to 
the year of its accession as seen in Figure IX (D).  
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Figure IX (D): Value of merchandise exports of 
China and Viet Nam: 1995-2009 
  
 
Overall, the results and momentum generated from 
accession-driven domestic reforms and liberalization have been 
clearly reflected in the better than average trade performance 
of RAMs compared with founding WTO Members. Only RAMs 
that have experienced domestic political difficulties have seen 
the nullification of the effects of domestic economic reforms for 
trade opening. WTO accession process and corresponding 
commitments to GATT/WTO rules have provided a strong 
impetus for developing countries to create their own reform 
momentum, improve their trade growth performance, and 
provide institutional reinforcement for the WTO in market 
access and rule terms.  
Furthermore, the behavior of RAMs has influenced the 
agenda and contemporary functioning of the WTO in two ways. 
First, RAMs have explicitly accepted the standard rules and 
the “rules plus” in their terms of accession. Second, although 
RAMs have held a defensive line in the Doha Round 
negotiations, beyond what they judge as their already 
substantial tariff concessions and specific commitments in their 
bilateral market accession negotiations, most RAMs have been 
proactive in pushing current acceding governments to lower 
levels of protection. RAMs have also maintained the line that 
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of accession negotiations, pursuant to Article XII of the 
Marrakesh Agreement.  
One of the original insights by Hudec was that 
governments, under liberal trade policy regimes, need the same 
sort of powers to resist protectionist demands as those 
advocated by infant industry proponents for government 
intervention to improve on imperfect market outcomes.128 
Consequently, Hudec argued that by using constraining 
procedures established by multilateral rules, governments 
could acquire greater control over policy and substantially 
increase welfare gains.129 “Far from diminishing sovereignty, 
such legal restraints would increase it.”130 This lucid and 
logical argument is now frequently used to show that the 
constraints in multilateral rules and disciplines assist in 
locking-in welfare-increasing domestic reforms. Because trade 
policymaking is subject to the political economy, interventionist 
policies are almost impossible to control. A question to which 
Hudec drew attention was the necessity of ensuring that 
prudent and correct judgments are made about where and 
when to intervene.131 The accession process and results not 
only provide support for this argument, namely that 
multilateral rules help governments lock-in domestic reforms, 
but also demonstrate that the process and results were critical 
in generating momentum for trade liberalization in developing 
RAMs and economies in transition.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
From the mid-1980s there was a change in the trade policy 
behavior of developing countries. They embarked on far-
reaching domestic policy reforms and trade liberalization. This 
behavior was neither collective, nor organized group behavior. 
There were differences in timing, pace, depth, and focus in 
these reforms. Collectively observed, the trade policy behavior 
of developing countries has reflected both fast-clipped, offensive 
trade liberalizing behavior and, at the same time, defensive 
 
 128. Professor Hudec’s argument was in relation to GATT Article XVIII 
and he was always clear that governments must always refuse to undertake 
wasteful investments. See HUDEC, supra note 2.  
 129. See id. at 175 
 130. Id.  
 131. See id. at 144–51. 
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postures that border on protection. Uniform characterization 
has been limited by the heterogeneity of the group. 
Nonetheless, the facts demonstrate that in contrast to the trade 
policy behavior in the 1960s GATT era reflecting protectionism, 
industrial policy behavior, exemption orientations from 
systemic trading rules and non-market systems, developing 
countries that committed to domestic reforms and trade 
liberalization have had significant economic payoffs. They have 
grown faster than the traditional trading nations. They have 
recovered quicker from crisis. They are now considered by 
development economists as the “global growth locomotives.”132 
They have demonstrated greater ambition in the long-standing 
and most distorted areas of negotiations in the Doha Round, 
although they seek flexibilities in other areas and reflect 
caution in such areas as financial services liberalization. What 
factors explain the domestic reforms and the shift to trade 
liberalizing behavior in those developing countries that 
embarked on these reforms? What have been the implications 
of this trade liberalizing behavior and its significant positive 
economic pay-offs for developing countries in their relationship 
with developed country counterparts?  
A combination of domestic and external factors, including 
the role of personalities who managed these reforms, explains 
the drive to reform and trade liberalization in developing 
countries. In the 1980s, developing countries reversed 1960s 
and 1970s protectionist policies and an exemption orientation 
from GATT rules and shifted to an ambitious reformist agenda. 
This imperative reform agenda was implemented in response to 
the 1980s growth shock crises133 and recession, domestic 
development priorities, and multilateral reform pressures from 
the 1986 launch of the Uruguay Round. This liberalization 
momentum was sustained by the changing global political 
economy highlighted by the emergence of democracy in Latin 
America, the collapse of the socialist experiment of command 
economies and the consequent transition to market economies.  
Current analysis has accorded insufficient weight to the 
effect of the multilateral rules and institutions in modifying the 
 
 132. See Canuto, supra note 56, at 1, 4.  
 133. These crises included the second oil shock (1979–81), the inability of 
Mexico to service its debt, increased interest rates in the United States meant 
to reduce double-digit inflation, and the ensuing global recession.  
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domestic behavior of leaders. The effect of the rules-based 
Multilateral Trading System in particular has been 
underestimated. The architecture of the WTO has operated to 
secure rule-compliant, trade-reformist behavior and exercised 
systemic constraints on individual Members to check and 
counter protectionism. This architecture rests on the pillars of 
enforceable rules, under the DSU, periodic Trade Policy 
Reports and monitoring reports, within the framework of the 
TPRM, and the accumulating effects of the terms of accession of 
RAMs, pursuant to Article XII accession negotiations. This 
architecture, renovated by periodic trade rounds, has acted in 
combination with domestic growth priorities, in developing 
countries, to generate and sustain the momentum for trade 
liberalization.  
Always at risk of inertia, rollback, or protectionist 
encroachment, the Multilateral Trading System has relied on 
successive rounds of trade negotiations to inject momentum, 
sustain further trade liberalization, or keep protectionism at 
bay. Trade rounds combined with recourse to the DSU, Trade 
Policy Reviews, terms of accession, and the regular functioning 
of the rules-based system, have generated constant multilateral 
energy for reform, liberalization, and compliance with extant 
rules, particularly in developing countries.  
There are three recent examples of trade reform policy 
behavior by developing countries, inspired by the unique trade 
liberalizing and anti-protectionist WTO architecture. These are 
i) the Indian proposal on Strengthening the WTO; ii) virtually 
unanimous developing country support for the monitoring 
process initiated by the WTO Director-General in 2008, 
reporting on developments associated with the financial and 
economic crisis, to ensure that markets remain open for global 
recovery; and iii) the African Sectoral Initiative on Cotton, 
which invokes trade rules to challenge United States domestic 
support in the cotton sector. Yet, trade opening behavior has 
not been uniform and consistent. There is also the learned 
behavior of developing countries, illustrated in the numerical 
increase in the use of trade defense mechanisms with 
protectionist effects. For instance, between 1995 and 2009, 
developing countries reported 1,604 anti-dumping measures in 
comparison to 770 such measures by developed countries.  
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The WTO accession process is one of the most powerful 
explanations for domestic reforms and trade liberalization in 
developing countries. The results of these accessions provide 
critical insight into reforms in about twenty-five WTO RAMs. 
Unfortunately, general analysis of the results of these 
accessions has narrowly and exclusively focused on the issue of 
costs divorced from the broader immediate and longer-term 
effects for trade performance and growth. Across specific areas 
of coverage of Article XII accession negotiations,134 acceding 
governments have accepted commitments, backed-up by 
domestic legislation that have confirmed acceptance of extant 
GATT rules, and gone further to complement, reinforce and, in 
some areas, extend these rules adapted to the particular 
circumstance of the acceding government. These commitments 
have strengthened the MFN principle, concretely improved 
trade openness and transparency, set a clear direction for 
sustained market reforms and trade opening and, have not 
undermined the non-discrimination principle. The results and 
momentum generated from WTO accession-driven domestic 
reforms and liberalization have been clearly reflected in the 
better than average trade performance of RAMs in contrast to 
founding WTO Members, with the exception of those instances 
where domestic political difficulties have nullified the effect of 
reform and trade opening. Controlling for periods of financial 
and economic crises, recession, and domestic turmoil, trade 
data indicate that RAMs achieved significant gains in trade 
performance with more stable performance following their 
accession-related domestic reforms and trade liberalization, 
compared to the pre-accession reform period.135 The analyzed 
trade data indicate that the international trade of all RAMs 
increased significantly as they started to implement their 
accession-related reforms, some of these pre-accession, others 
upon accession, and some through agreed phased transition. 
From 1995 to 2009, their value of merchandise trade grew at 
average annual rates of 13%, while trade in commercial 
services grew by 11%. These average annual growth rates were 
much faster in comparison to the growth of world merchandise 
trade at 7% and services at 8% in the same period. In the 
period between 1995 and 2008, the value of merchandise trade 
 
 134. See supra p. 404.  
 135. See supra pp. 417–24. 
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of all RAMs rose by approximately 500%, in contrast to world 
trade that increased by approximately 200%.  
As trade liberalization and domestic reforms have 
proceeded apace in developing countries, some of these 
countries, within a diverse group, insist on differentiated 
treatment. There have been suggestions that special and 
differential treatment has undermined the principle of non-
discrimination. Non-discrimination is positively associated with 
openness and competition and also explains, in part, the 
liberalizing behavior of developing countries. Policy-wise there 
are serious misgivings about the accumulating effects of 
differentiated treatment in a system of legally enforceable rules 
and disciplines. Systemic vigilance and monitoring is required 
to ensure that the value of predictable rules and disciplines are 
not eroded. However, legally, WTO jurisprudence demonstrates 
that special and differential treatment has not undermined the 
foundation principle of non-discrimination. The trade policy 
behavior of Members, including developing Members, has been 
significantly influenced by WTO DSU jurisprudence and 
systemic rules. The jurisprudence and the rules have 
consistently upheld the non-discrimination principle. Both the 
jurisprudence, on questions addressed, and Members’ rules 
recognize that differentiation in treatment may be applied, as 
exceptions and without such differentiation undermining the 
foundation non-discrimination principle. For instance, in 
European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of 
Preferences to Developing Countries (EC—Tariff Preferences), 
the Appellate Body (AB) upheld the Panel’s finding that the 
1979 Enabling Clause is an exception to GATT Article I.1.136 
However, the AB also concluded that in granting differential 
tariff treatment, in accordance with non-discrimination, 
preference-granting countries are “required . . . to ensure that 
identical treatment is available to all similarly-situated GSP 
beneficiaries . . . that have the ‘development, financial and 
trade needs’ to which the treatment in question is intended to 
 
 136. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Conditions for the 
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 
7, 2004). 
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respond.”137 Differential treatment has also been addressed 
through Article IX waivers.138  
Notwithstanding the trade reform agenda of developing 
countries, LDCs in particular, within the developing country 
group, maintain demands for specific rule exemptions. 
Different categories of non-LDC low income countries seek 
differentiated rule and market access treatment and developing 
countries in general seek policy space and rule flexibility.  
On the foundation of far-reaching reforms and strong 
economic performance, a group of emerging economies led by 
Brazil, China, and India have become locomotives for recovery 
and growth in the global economy. Their role is critical in 
coordinated efforts with the post-World War II traditional 
economies of the United States, the EU27, and Japan in 
addressing global macroeconomic balances. The cooperative 
negotiating engagement of these two groups of countries is 
indispensable in resolving the disagreements and sorting out 
the trading rules under the Doha Round to govern trade 
relations in the twenty-first century. The absence of agreement 
is reflected in the progress and reversals in the Doha Round 
over the past ten years, with effective deadlock since July 
2008.139 The relationship between developed and developing 
countries is captured by the situation in the Doha Round. It is a 
complex relationship, explained by historic shifts in the global 
balance of trade and economic power. Tensions, disagreements 
and conflicts are being played out in the Doha Round. The 
emerging economies are calling for a greater stake in the rules-
 
 137. Id. para. 173. 
 138. Three examples are helpful. First, the Doha Decision on waiver for 
EC-ACP partnership agreement waiving EC obligation under GATT Article 
1.1, with respect to the granting of preferential treatment for products 
originating from ACP States (waiver was until December 31, 2007). See World 
Trade Organization, European Communities—the ACP-EC Partnership 
Agreement, WT/MIN(01)/15 (Nov. 14, 2001). Second, the 2001 Decision on 
Transitional Regime for Banana imports, based on the European 
Communities’ waiver request from its obligations under GATT Article XIII 
paragraphs 1 and 2. See World Trade Organization, European Communities—
Transitional Regime for the EC Autonomous Tariff Rate Quotas on Imports of 
Bananas, WT/MIN(01)/16 (Nov. 14, 2001). Third, the Waiver for the United 
States African Growth and Opportunity Act which was granted on May 27, 
2009 and is in effect until September 30, 2015. See United State—African 
Growth and Opportunity Act, WT/L/754 (May 29, 2009).  
 139. E.g., Giles, Beattie & Oliver, Leaders Warn on Doha Deadlock, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dde10ee6-edb3-
11df-9612-00144feab49a.html#axzz1EnnmUBqB. 
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based system, commensurate with their enhanced trade and 
economic standings on the foundation of ambitious reforms. 
The response of the developed Members is that a higher stake 
in an adjusted rules-based Multilateral Trading System, that 
provides greater accommodation to the emergent economies, 
entails acceptance of increased responsibility and greater 
leadership to support the system. For instance, the United 
States in responding to allegations of unrealistic Doha Round 
proposals countered: “What is not realistic is the notion that a 
few of the world’s most powerful trading nations can play by a 
set of rules that gives them largely unfettered access to global 
markets—without giving appropriate reciprocity in return.”140 
In its view, this was neither a basis for a sustainable trading 
system nor an appropriate outcome for the Doha Round.141  
There is an urgency to Doha Round completion to, inter 
alia, address the complex and evolving relationship between 
the developed and developing countries. The high income 
emerging economies are integrated into the global economy, 
ascendant and growing faster than the traditional economic 
powers. The low and middle-income developing countries 
require assistance for their continued integration into the 
rules-based Multilateral Trading System. The value of the 
Doha Round has been typically assessed in terms of the value 
of what is on the table, with welfare estimates of between 
US$43 billion and US$300 billion.142 However, the value of the 
Doha Round is much more than the welfare calculations.143 Not 
only are their considerable welfare gains, there are also 
systemic benefits. Even more, this paper has argued that there 
are yet more enduring gains embedded in the long-term 
 
 140. Ambassador Michael Punke, U.S. Permanent Rep. to the World Trade 
Org., Statement to the Trade Negotiations Committee (Nov. 30, 2010) 
http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/11/30/statement-by-ambassador-punke-to-
the-trade-negotiations-committee/.  
 141. See id.  
 142. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Address at the Workshop on Recent 
Analyses of the Doha Round (Nov. 2, 2010). See also Hoekman, Martin & 
Mattoo, Conclude Doha: It Matters!, 9 WORLD TRADE REVIEW 505–30 (2010).  
 143. See generally Hoekman, Martin & Mattoo, supra note 142, at 514 (The 
Doha Round offers “market access” trade facilitation and “the aid for trade 
initiative.”); Pascal Lamy, Director-General, World Trade Org., Speech at the 
10th Anniversary of the World Trade Institute: The Changing Patterns of 
World Trade (Oct. 1, 2010) (“What is at stake is more than the economic 
benefits that would flow from a successful Doha deal. The real issue is the 
relevance of the multilateral trading system itself.”).  
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management of the relationship between the traditional 
trading powers and the emergent economies of China, Brazil, 
India, and others. This relationship requires periodic 
adjustments through successive rounds of trade negotiations. 
As painful as they may be, there is a permanent rationale to 
trade rounds. Trade Rounds not only address specific trade and 
economic difficulties, but also provide a forum for necessary 
periodic adjustments in the ever-changing global balance in 
trade and economic power.  
All Members and negotiating coalitions have a role to play 
in trade rounds. But, every negotiation requires critical, driving 
leadership by a core group of Members. The leadership reflects 
a combination of major-trader status, emergent powers, and an 
institutional understanding of the vital importance of 
multilateral institutions to manage changes in global order. In 
the immediate post–World War II era, this role was played by 
the United States. Canada, the EU, and Japan were to join in 
the famous, productive and successful QUAD leadership of the 
Multilateral Trading System in the GATT, up until just before 
the launch of the Uruguay Round in 1986. This world has 
dramatically changed. While the role of the traditional traders 
in the QUAD remain vital new, powerful, and ascendant 
economies have emerged. Brazil, China and India are pre-
eminent. In August 2010, China became the second largest 
economy in the world,144 and as of 2009 India is the fifth largest 
and Brazil the tenth largest. These robust and dynamic, 
developing economies and the traditional economies will need 
to work more effectively, imaginatively and cooperatively on 
the Doha Round.  
The WTO is a permanent negotiating forum, where 
Members agree to the rules that regulate global trade. Its rules 
are enforceable. It operates a dispute settlement system that 
adjudicates trade differences that arise between Members. It is 
a global public good, providing benefits that cannot be supplied 
by other institutions. If this system of rules did not exist, it 
would have to be created. The global public advantage of the 
WTO was evident during the 2008–2009 global economic and 
financial crisis. It was widely acknowledged that protectionism 
 
 144. See David Barboza, China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/globa
l/16yuan.html. 
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did not break out, despite the recession and high levels of 
unemployment, because of the restraining effect of the rules of 
the WTO and its monitoring oversight. Both the WTO, as an 
international organization, and the Doha Round, as a 
negotiating engagement, are vital in managing the enduring 
questions surrounding the relationship between traditional and 
emergent trading powers, a question put on the agenda in Bob 
Hudec’s classic.  
